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Today, we celebrate the first annual conference of a second decade in
LatCrit theory, community, and praxis,' an experiment in critical outsider juris-
prudence that Jerome helped mightily to make possible.2 Sadly, we do so with
* Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Hispanic and Caribbean Legal Studies,
University of Miami. I thank the organizers, sponsors, and participants of the LatCrit XI
conference, where this Lecture was delivered. In particular, I thank Professor Robert Chang
for inviting me to deliver this Second Annual Culp LatCrit Lecture. I dedicate this Lecture
to Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr. and to his work. Here, I aim to emulate his example. All
errors are mine.
For an overview of the LatCrit experience, from origins to the present, see Angela P.
Harris et al., Beyond the First Decade: A Forward-Looking History of LatCrit Theory, Com-
munity and Praxis, 17 L RAZA L.J. 169 (2006). The term "LatCrit" was coined at a 1995
colloquium, held in Puerto Rico, on the relationship of critical race theory to "Latina/o"
communities. From that colloquium, the annual conferences then flowed. See Francisco
Valdes, Poised at the Cusp: LatCrit Theory, Outsider Jurisprudence and Latinalo Self-
Empowerment, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REv. 1 (1997) (introducing the papers and proceedings
of the first LatCrit conference). On the emergence of a "LatCrit" subject position, see Berta
Esperanza Hemndez-Truyol, Indivisible Identities: Culture Clashes, Confused Constructs
and Reality Checks, 2 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 199, 200-05 (1997); Kevin R. Johnson &
George A. Martinez, Crossover Dreams: The Roots of LatCrit Theory in Chicanalo Studies
Activism and Scholarship, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1143 (1999); cf. Margaret E. Montoya,
LatCrit Theory: Mapping Its Intellectual and Political Foundations and Future Self-Critical
Directions, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1119 (1999). See also Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco
Valdes, Afterword - Religion, Gender, Sexuality, Race and Class in Coalitional Theory: A
Critical and Self-Critical Analysis of LatCrit Social Justice Agendas, 19 CHICANO-LATINO
L. REV. 503, 568-71 (1998) (discussing the choice of "LatCrit" as partly a political decision
to identify as much as possible with people of color, indigenous people, and other tradition-
ally subordinated groups in the construction of this new discourse and praxis).
2 The term "outsider jurisprudence" was first used by Professor Mari J. Matsuda. See Mari
J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MicH. L.
REV. 2320, 2323 (1989). Here, the term is preceded with "critical" to emphasize this key
feature of the body of work to which LatCrit theory belongs. LatCrit theory is one strand in
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Jerome in our midst only in spirit.3 But while among us in the flesh, he
attended every single LatCrit conference, from the first in San Diego through
the eighth in Cleveland.4 And at the very first one, he asked a question that
was then foundational, and remains still pressing: how to participate in the
struggles of those who are not us?5 That is the question always before us;
though struggling for one's own rights is not easy, struggling for the rights of
others can be that much harder. Invoking that expansive and determined spirit,
the title of this talk, of this Second Annual Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr. LatCrit
Lecture,6 is The Constitution of Terror: Big Lies, Backlash Jurisprudence, and
the Rule of Law in the United States Today. As this title indicates, this Lecture
tackles big ideas, complex topics, in the brief time allotted. But much of the
substantive terrain will be familiar - even though oftentimes suppressed or dis-
torted in the process of constituting today's reign of terror. So, I will touch
only on the highlights, and trust that suppressed knowledge is not always for-
gotten knowledge and that we can revive it together through acts of
remembrance.
With these circumstances and limitations in mind, in this Lecture I aim to
center the process by which a sense of intimidation, control, and terror has been
constituted within the United States, especially since 2000, to silence any dis-
sent or opposition to the consolidation of political and economic power in the
hands of the current occupant of the White House and his ideological handlers.
In particular, I hope to train our collective, critical attention to a few of the key
Big Lies that have paved the way for the ongoing constitution of a terrorized
nation on the part of its current rulers. Oftentimes, as I outline below, these Big
Lies emanate from backlash-identified quarters of the nation's legal culture,
including judicial appointees, or certainly with their complicity. I focus on
these law-identified Big Lies because we - most, if not all of us here today -
are part of this nation's legal culture, embedded within it: as legal scholars
with the formal training to expose these Big Lies, I hope to sound an
antisubordination alarm and to spur corrective action. I hope to nudge us
toward timely collective resistance as critical legal scholars committed to social
justice - toward performing the intellectual work that might inform popular
resistance to this constitution of terror in the name of Law and Liberty.
The Lecture proceeds in four main parts. The first focuses on some key
basics regarding our positions within the legal academy of this legalistic super-
critical outsider jurisprudence, along with critical race theory, critical race feminism, Asian
American scholarship, and Queer legal theory. See also infra note 9 (on "OutCrit").
I Jerome died in February, 2004. For more information on Jerome Culp and his work, visit
the LatCrit website at http://www.latcrit.org.
I For the programs and other information relating to the Annual LatCrit Conferences, please
visit the LatCrit website at http://www.latcrit.org.
I Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Latinos, Blacks, Others, and the New Legal Narrative, 2
HARV. LAT. L. REv. 479 (1997).
6 The Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Memorial LatCrit Lecture ("JCL") honors founding
Board Member Jerome Culp, Jr., who passed away in 2004, and is designed to ensure a
substantive continuation of his work in the areas of law, policy, and socioeconomic justice.
Each year's annual lecturer is selected and invited by a committee. For more information,




power, to foreground what we might do in Jerome's footsteps qua critical out-
sider scholars. The second part outlines several prominent and pernicious Big
Lies of the moment, to which Jerome's booming voice would demand that we
turn our skills and attention. The third asks us to contemplate what comes next,
after this period of massive illegality in the name of Law, as Jerome no doubt
already would be asking here today: What comes next, when the furies of
reaction and backlash are spent, as surely they will be - are we preparing for
"truth" . . . is reconciliation possible? And then, the fourth part closes this
year's Culp LatCrit Lecture with four mantras for critical survival and two calls
to concrete collective action as a community of activist scholars.
II. CRITICAL OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP AND RESISTANCE TO BACKLASH:
DOING WHAT (ONLY?) WE CAN
Though Jerome clearly understood that antisubordination theory and prac-
tice are always multi-faceted and multi-dimensional endeavors, he also empha-
sized the importance, the centrality, the indispensability of knowledge-
production to the mission of outsider legal scholarship; in other words, he never
veered from the roles and responsibilities we bear specifically as critical schol-
ars in a legalistic society.7 Though we must remain engaged in multiple activi-
ties and communities, our unique contributions, if any, to the historical quest
for local and global social justice must be built, in great measure, on the unique
resources, skills, talents, and opportunities that mark us collectively and indi-
vidually as outsider legal scholars. For simplicity's sake, we might group our
unique or formal kinds of training, skills, and contributions around three basic
sets of scholarly initiative and activity: (1) interrogation, (2) interconnection,
and (3) introduction. Allow me to explain briefly.
Interrogation, perhaps the most basic, consists of asking the critical ques-
tions. To interrogate critically is to question the multiple arrays of assump-
tions, imperatives, and effects - unspoken as well as spoken - that drive the
status quo.8 As OutCrit scholars,9 we take interrogation to the next level by
interconnecting local or otherwise discrete observations - by moving sociolegal
7 See, e.g., Jerome M. Culp, Jr., et al., Subject Unrest, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2435 (2003) (in this
essay, the last he wrote and published, Jerome clearly evinces this sensibility).
8 See, e.g., Culp, Jr., supra note 5, at 480 ("... LatCrit ought to mean - that we do not
accept the status quo."). For an early and eloquent exposition of this methodological point,
see generally Mari J. Matsuda, Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory Out of
Coalition, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1183, 1189 (1991) (urging antisubordination analyses to "ask
the other question" as a means of theorizing across single-axis group boundaries).
9 The "OutCrit" denomination is an effort to conceptualize and operationalize the social
justice analyses and struggles of varied and overlapping yet "different" subordinated groups
in an interconnective way. "OutCrit" thus refers (at least initially) to those scholars who
identify and align themselves with outgroups in this country, as well as globally, including
most notably those who in recent times have launched lines of critical inquiry within legal
culture, including critical legal studies. But while "outsider jurisprudence" may be, but is
not always nor necessarily "critical" in perspective, the OutCrit stance is, by definition, criti-
cal in nature. See generally, supra note 2 (on outsider jurisprudence). OutCrit positionality,
then, is framed around the need to critique and combat, in collective and coordinated ways,
the mutually-reinforcing systems of structural subordination and domination that construct
both outgroups and ingroups. For further discussion of this OutCrit designation, see Fran-
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analyses from the atomized to the structural, from the individual to the mul-
tifaceted systems of subordination that interlock to encase us all. This move
from interrogation to interconnection positions us to discern and document the
patterns that varied particularities accumulate to create "different" yet mutu-
ally-reinforcing supremacies.'o Finally, the third basic kind of skill is introduc-
tion - the act of importing "new" knowledge, oftentimes historical in nature,
and applying it to the situation or issue under study."' Introduction entails the
reclamation of "new" or suppressed knowledge and facts to re-contextualize, to
reframe, that which we have interrogated and interconnected. In combination,
this trio forms a basic OutCrit toolbox. Now is the time to reach into it, and to
pull from it the necessary implements to begin preparations for a return of
formal democracy and due process of law to these lands.
As Jerome and other critical pioneers have taught us, these three tools or
techniques permit us to assemble and reassemble information to produce,
record, and transmit antisubordination knowledge, to spur personal resistance
against all systems of oppression, based on new and sharper understandings of
social injustices and their origins. These basics therefore bring us to perhaps
the principal question that this Lecture places squarely before us every year:
"What would Jerome do?" "What would Jerome do now with these particular
kinds of skills, under the specific challenges of the moment?" In the remaining
parts of this Lecture, I take up this question.
Ill. BIG LIES, BACKLASH POLITICS, AND "LEGAL" SUBVERSION: WHAT
WOULD JEROME Do?
The constitution of terror is built in great measure on the resurrection of
discredited constitutional doctrines that aim to bring back some very old (and
raw) deals in American law and society. Oftentimes, this mammoth, ongoing
project of resurrection is cloaked in a collection of Big Lies that operate
together, within the United States and beyond it, that attempt to justify injus-
tice. These Big Lies help to foment and keep in place the intellectual and
political constitution of terror that today passes for the Rule of Law in the
United States. Let us briefly apply interrogation, interconnection, and introduc-
tion to several of these, as we sketch them in the way that Jerome might have.
cisco Valdes, Outsider Scholars, Legal Theory & OutCrit Perspectivity: Postsubordination
Vision as Jurisprudential Method, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 831 (2000).
C0 Gulp, Jr., et al, supra note 7, at 2446-52.
" The example of courses on Asian Americans and the Law, which oftentimes integrate
history into the law curriculum, illustrates this point. See generally Francisco Valdes, Out-
sider Jurisprudence, Critical Pedagogy and Social Justice Activism: Marking the Stirrings
of Critical Legal Education, 10 ASIAN L.J. 65 (2003). More generally, the reclamation of
suppressed knowledges is central to the social justice project of critical outsider jurispru-
dence. See, e.g., Sumi Cho & Robert Westley, Historicizing Critical Race Theory's Cutting
Edge: Key Movements that Performed the Theory, in CROSSROADS, DIRECTIONS, AND A
NEW CRITICAL RACE THEORY 32 (Francisco Valdes et al. eds., 2002).
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A. Modern "Originalism" as Substantive Framework for Constitutional
Democracy in U.S.
The first Big Lie is that prevalent forms of contemporary originalism pro-
vide the "true" substantive framework for constitutionalism - constitutional
democracy - in the United States.' 2 Originalism, of course, refers to the ideol-
ogy that would posit "Framers' intent" (and related historical indicia) as the
first and best answer to all constitutional questions.13 Modem originalism
therefore has been described aptly (and kindly) as a "one-step" approach to the
serious and complex business of constitutional interpretation.14 This step
requires (merely) that judges look back to the late 1700s, when the Constitution
was drafted and ratified, and then do whatever they imagine might have been
done back then. But this insistence on looking only backwards, to the "origi-
nal" context, ignores the necessary "second step" in the process: applying the
words to changing contexts, the present and future or, in other words, "translat-
ing" original meanings or objectives into present-day situations, in much the
same way interpreters translate terms or texts from one language to another all
the time, even while trying to retain and convey original purposes or meanings.
As a prime exponent of this one-step approach likes to put it: "Now, my
theory of what I do when I try to interpret the American Constitution is I try to
understand what it meant, what it was understood to mean when it was adopted.
12 For a sympathetic and contemporary overview, see JOHNATHAN O'NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN
AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY (2005). Over time, of course,
and as with any other discursive movement, various strains or versions of originalism have
been aired. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Scalia's Infidelity: A Critique of "Faint-Hearted"
Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006). However, the currently prevalent version, both
jurisprudentially and politically, is associated with the culture wars and their legal compo-
nent - backlash jurisprudence. See infra notes 42, 74-77 and accompanying text (on the
culture wars). This version is the focus of this Lecture. See O'NEILL, supra, at 94-160
(tracing the construction of this version of originalism from the 1960s to the 1980s). For an
excellent (liberal) presentation of the prevailing or backlash version/s of originalism, see
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right's Living Consti-
tution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006) (outlining the political history and dynamic of this
jurisprudential ideology, including current political deployments).
13 For an influential and relatively contemporary exposition of today's originalism, see
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989) (urging
Framers' intent and other historical factors as the best tools for constitutional interpretation,
even if in the form of "faint-hearted" originalism); see also Edwin Meese III, Interpreting
the Constitution, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT
13 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990) (elaborating Reagan-style "originalism," which is the cur-
rently prevalent version, and the one associated with backlash jurisprudence and cultural
warfare). For other influential elaborations of originalist arguments, see infra notes 40-47
and sources cited therein.
Despite the current political dominance of originalism, responses and alternatives con-
tinue to be forthcoming. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 245 (2002) (questioning premises of formalism, originalism, textualism, and other
methods associated with backlash jurisprudence and its selective embrace of originalist ide-
ology and practice); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States:
Contemporary Ratification, in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGI-
NAL INTENT, supra note 13, at 23 (setting forth a similar, earlier critique of originalist
imperatives).
14 Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1992-93).
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And I don't think it changes since then."15 Slowly but surely, this approach
freezes society into an increasingly rigid mold, a mold set in the 1700s. Moreo-
ver, it's not what the Framers did, nor what they intended.
Nonetheless, one-step or modern-day originalists insist that this approach
constrains unprincipled exercises of public power, especially by "liberal" fed-
eral judges too keen on "rights." 16 Typically, this insistence is offered as
originalism's great virtue - despite the contrary record its adherents have accu-
mulated: while clamoring against judicial activism and its unprincipled, anti-
democratic nature, originalist backlashers have put together "the most activist
Supreme Court in history" in the past decade or so.' 7 Indeed, the "current
ascendancy of originalism does not reflect the analytic force of its jurispru-
dence... [but rather that it] provides its proponents a compelling language in
which to seek constitutional change through adjudication and politics."' 8 To
understand modern-day, or one-step, originalism we must understand it as a
"political practice" in which backlash-identified judicial appointees, like Scalia
and Thomas, "use their judicial opinions as conscious tools to excite the anger,
fears, and resentments of conservative constituencies, and thus to fan the fires
of political mobilization."' 9 Junking wholesale well-established areas of doc-
trine and upsetting longstanding legislative schemes without batting an eyelash
" Justice Antonin Scalia, Transcript of Discussion Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices
Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer, AU Washington College of Law (Jan. 13, 2005), availa-
ble at http://domino.american.edu/AU/media/mediarel.nsf/D265343BDC2189785256B81
0071F238/1F2F7DC4757FD01E85256F890068E6E0?OpenDocument.
16 The demonized era of "liberal activist judges" is depicted as beginning in earnest during
the 1960s under Chief Justice Earl Warren and is portrayed as the complaint of backlashers,
who "promise ... that their replacements will not be so free-wheeling." See, e.g., Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U.
COLO. L. REV. 293 (1992). For now-classic expositions of this backlash portrayal, see
RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT By JUDICIARY (1977), and ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING
OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); see also Robert H. Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). This cam-
paign of course evokes historical and legitimate concerns over abuses of power, including
judicial abuses. For noted examples, see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH (1962), and Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,
73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959); see also MARTIN SHAPIRO, LAW AND POLITICS IN THE SUPREME
COURT (1964). For historical accounts, see LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND
AMERICAN POLITICS (2000); J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM Brown to Bakke: The
Supreme Court and School Integration: 1954-1978 (1979). For a remarkable insider's
account of the appointment to the Court of Justice Rehnquist, and the ideological purposes
behind his appointment in the context of the gathering culture wars, see JOHN W. DEAN, THE
REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED
THE SUPREME COURT (2001); DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE
REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT (1992).
17 E.g., THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY (2004)
(reviewing the recent record of backlash activism); Peter J. Smith, Sources of Federalism:
An Empirical Analysis of the Court's Quest for Original Meaning, 52 UCLA L. REV. 217
(2004) (releasing the findings of a recent study, which concluded that "judges seeking the
original understanding are largely unconstrained in their ability to mold the historical record
to serve instrumental goals"); see also infra note 59 and sources cited therein (on judicial
manipulation of legal rules to reach preferred results in recent decades).
18 Post & Siegel, supra note 12, at 549.
'9 Id. at 567.
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or minding their own words about restraint, backlash-identified appointees
deploy what they call "originalism" to inscribe willfully their "anti-anti-dis-
crimination agenda" onto the nation's heritage - to inflict wounds on individual
rights and civil liberties designed to last long.20 Their appointments were pre-
meditated acts of cultural warfare on behalf of "traditional" elites and interests,
and they continue to act as if they well know it.
2 1
Of course, as a theoretical (or doctrinal) proposition, the "intent" of signa-
tories to a written document certainly may be relevant to the interpretation of
its text (though not necessarily, nor automatically, dispositive of its meaning).
But the lie here is in the proposition that "original" intent provides a lens
through which first principles can be identified to guide exercises of public
power by lawmakers, including judges. Mainstream liberal scholars have long
shown the concept as being incoherent: there is no such thing as a single or
stable Framers' intent. 2 As the historical record amply demonstrates, the
Framers had different ideas and agendas as they forged the uneasy deflections,
ambiguities, and compromises that emerged from the Constitutional Conven-
tion in Philadelphia. 3 And as time passed, their respective and differing "orig-
inal" intents morphed for personal or political reasons as they argued with each
other about the meaning of the text they had commonly produced.2 4 Under its
own terms, then, originalism is conceptually incoherent because its founda-
tional premise is fatally flawed; the Framers had multiple, shifting, and mixed
intents, which compound many gaps, conflicts, or ambiguities in the larger his-
torical record, among which professed originalists routinely pick and choose
according to their tactical or strategic political needs.
Yet, today's originalists ignore this history and/or cherry-pick juicy quota-
tions to skew our impressions of historical realities in accordance with their
present-day agendas: to argue for the primacy of their version/s of originalism,
they actually rely more on the views of the Anti-Federalists (whose views did
not garner majority support either during the Convention or ratification) than
20 I borrow the apt term from Rubenfeld, infra note 74 (on the "anti-anti-discrimination
agenda"); see also generally, infra notes 42, 59, and 70 and sources cited therein (on the
maneuvers, gyrations, and tactics of backlash appointees bent on re-writing the Constitution
to impose retrenchment of New Deal and Civil Rights legacies).
21 See infra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (on the culture wars).
22 For a powerful example, see Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Under-
standing, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).
23 For a good compilation of original differences, see PAGE SMITH, THE CONSTITUTION: A
DOCUMENTARY AND NARRATIVE HISTORY (1980); see also LYNCH, infra note 40, at 8-70
(reviewing debates within the founding generation over constitutional meanings). For a set
of sympathetic profiles that reflects these differences, see Tim Slover, The Characters
Behind the Constitution, 6 BYU J. PUB. L. 513 (1992).
24 The controversies over the Bank of the United States are an apt illustration. See infra
notes 32-41 and accompanying text (on the first and second Bank).
25 For a typical example, see Meese, supra note 13, at 17 (plucking strategic quotations
from Madison and Jefferson to support his arguments while excising inconvenient historical
facts from the account). To broaden the account, see infra notes 40 and 42 and sources cited
therein (on Madison's flip-flops regarding constitutional meaning and interpretation). For
recent confirmation of this taboo, see Smith, supra note 17 (reporting results of empirical
study finding judges "mold the historical record" to suit their ideological agendas); see also
infra note 58 and sources cited therein (on judicial manipulation of law, precedent, and
procedure to arrive at judges' politically preferred results).
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those of the Federalists (who did garner majority support both during the Con-
vention and ratification). 26 This anti-majoritarianism is surprising, if not hypo-
critical, coming from today's originalists, who profess adoration of
majoritarianism as the essence of democracy - even the fictional sort of majori-
tarianism that in fact is anti-democratic. 27
Let's make sure we all got that, because it's really a bit breathtaking when
we pause to reflect on it: today, originalism oftentimes is justified (at least by
its judicial adherents) as a species of relatively certain legislative history, which
ensures interpretive fidelity to the final constitutional text, but this gyration is
accomplished by resorting to (selective) quotes from the historical record that
prioritize the views of the original losers, over those of the original winners,
whose text (and therefore, presumably also intent) is the ostensible focus of
originalist inquiry. In other words, today's self-styled originalists would have
us regard the views rejected formally at the founding by the Framers and
ratifiers of the Constitution as somehow binding now, and in perpetuity. Isn't
that a bit like asking Jefferson Davis and his Confederacy to supply the "origi-
nal intent" for today's definitive interpretation of the post-Civil War Recon-
struction Amendments enacted after the Union's victory? I know that textual
interpretation calls for nuance, and that parol evidence is sometimes permitted
in contracts cases, but do they actually teach this kind of stuff as proper legal
analysis or methodology in any accredited law school today? As a matter of
legal method, should the views of winners be drawn from the pens and mouths
of losers? Should the "original intent" of a party to any writing be imputed
from the self-interested sound-bites of the adversary party? Isn't that just a tad
mad?
Another key piece of known yet suppressed knowledge, which enables
assertion of this Big Lie, is that those men, the Framers themselves, did not
look to any conception of "intent" (much less their own) for anything of consti-
tutional consequence. They took vows of secrecy regarding their deliberations
and kept the windows of the building shut during that hot summer, precisely to
avoid this sort of constitutional voodoo.28 Moreover, when they walked in our
26 For a piercing account of this hypocrisy, see Smith, supra note 17, at 234-65 (presenting
findings of empirical study of originalist opinions invoking Framers' intent to justify
announced outcomes).
27 As we see below, this equation of democracy with majoritarianism is another Big Lie of
the moment. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text (on democracy and majoritarian-
ism under this particular Constitution).
28 To preclude any fragments of "intent" from becoming political footballs, the delegates to
the Constitutional Convention agreed at the very outset of their proceedings that "the ses-
sions were to be strictly secret." To enforce this mandate, "sentries [were] planted without
and within," the windows were kept shut despite the summer heat, and vows of secrecy were
exchanged. "So scrupulously was the order of secrecy observed that it was not until many
years afterward that anything definite was known of what took place in the convention."
MAx FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 58-59 (1913).
This "seal of secrecy" was broken most egregiously by James Madison, who posthumously
published his notes, but only after uncertain edits. Before dying, Madison had written that
he had chosen his seat and organized his time during that summer in order to compile his
copious notes, which have delighted historians. See id. at 59-60. His breach, however, has
helped to create the very conditions that the Framers, as a whole, seemed to have intended to
avoid: conditions that enable "Framers' intent" to become, after all, an ideological football -
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shoes, they didn't look to anyone else's 'intent' - real or bogus - to tell them
what should be done; instead, they turned to experience (and their interpretation
of experience) to help them give meaning to the idea of democracy, and to
distill that capacious idea to a text most of them could endorse (after much
debating and finagling). Indeed, to create the federal Constitution they looked
deliberatively toward the historical examples they imagined to be the most
comparable analogs in democratic society-building, in order to draw from the
history and example of others what they thought could be best transplanted to
their own times and challenges. 29 And notably, they carried on with that expe-
riential, comparative methodology even after they had succeeded in persuading
the voting colonial population3 ° to adopt their handiwork as the new nation's
supreme charter: 3 1 Whether in word or deed, the Framers never made a dis-
tinction between their work and ours, between the work of the first generation
and its posterity in the ongoing project of constitutional self-governance,
between the tasks of devising and applying this Constitution.
The national controversies over the First and Second Banks of the United
States illustrate these basic points.3 2 At issue, constitutionally, in those contro-
versies was whether the federal government was empowered to charter a corpo-
ration, such as the Bank. When those controversies initially erupted, the
Framers themselves (and their contemporaries) debated whether the document
that they had produced did or did not permit this exercise of power.33 Madison
especially during the past several decades under the rule of "originalist" judges and
politicians.
29 Of course, England and ancient Greece and Rome were their principal analogs. See CARL
J. RICHARD, THE FOUNDERS AND THE CLASSICS: GREECE, ROME AND THE AMERICAN
ENLIGHTENMENT (1994) (presenting a detailed and extensive study of the Framers' reliance
on historical and comparative examples for the project of constitution-making); see also
CHARLES F. MULLETT, FUNDAMENTAL LAW AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1760-1776
(1966). "In tracing the sources of American revolutionary ideas of fundamental law we may
as well begin with the Greeks, since the colonists in their search for eternal principles appli-
cable to their situation went no further back." Id. at 13.
30 The democratic nature of that voting of course is suspect, as the franchise was concen-
trated in racial and economic elites comprised mostly of men. See, e.g., A. LEON HIGGIN-
BOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR (1978) (surveying property-and-identity based
structures of inclusion or exclusion that limited exercise of political rights in formative years
of this country and legal system); Robert J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early
American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1989) (focusing on property and its relation to
voting eligibility).
31 Before proceeding any further, perhaps I should hasten to add a caveat on terminology:
my use of "Framers" in the plural is not a replication of originalism's defects. While keep-
ing their individuated motives and views uppermost in mind, I endeavor in this Lecture to
show only that, as a group, they did not endorse, or attempt to establish, today's originalism
as a secular religion to settle constitutional questions. The most that can be said about the
Framers and their compatriots is that they formed their "original" theories of distrust based
on their mutual experiences with each other. For more caveats, see infra note 103 and
accompanying text (recalling the brevity and other limitations of this exposition).
32 The basic story is told in the famous opinion of McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819). In McCulloch, the Supreme Court upheld federal legislation chartering
a federal bank even though the text of the Constitution does not expressly enumerate the
power to charter corporations among those vested in the federal legislature.
11 For an illuminating overall account of the litigation and its broader background, authored
by a conservative-identified scholar, see Daniel A. Farber, The Story of McCulloch: Bank-
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was a leading opponent from his perch in the House of Representatives,
together with Jefferson, who had resigned from the Cabinet as Secretary of
State after getting mad at Washington because the President favored his Secre-
tary of the Treasury, Hamilton, in Cabinet policy debates, including on the
Bank's establishment. Though both had favored the Constitution's adoption
(especially Madison, who originally had been a strongly nationalistic Framer),
they resurrected vanquished Anti-Federalist themes,34 which today we know as
originalism and strict construction (and related concepts). 35 Later, they both
switched their positions and arguments yet again: once in power as President,
Jefferson himself did not practice his own federal powers in the strict manner
he had once preached, as his executive unilateralism during the Louisiana
Purchase made so plain,3 6 while Madison reversed course on the Bank's consti-
tutionality soon enough.37 Each of these men - one a Framer and both foun-
ders - exhibited multiple and mutually-contradictory "intents" at different
times of their lives, regarding the very same and unchanged words of the docu-
ment, and both switched views depending on political or personal factors rather
than on principled intellectual analysis. Isn't it now a bit silly, not to mention
dishonest, to pick and choose among them manipulatively, as if they had not?3 8
Nonetheless, it is in this way that this bundle of cross-related concepts entered
once again into respectable general circulation, after the Anti-Federalists had
failed to stop the Constitution's ratification using them.
The First Bank was established despite this longstanding, ongoing contro-
versy over both the constitutionality and desirability of such an institution, but
its charter lapsed in 1811. The War of 1812 and its exigencies, however, soon
made plain to leading figures of the first generation the national need for the
institution, and a second charter was issued in 1816. This chartering of a Sec-
ond Bank of the United States became the flashpoint for the famous case that
decided its constitutionality, as well as much else about constitutional mean-
ing on National Power, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 33 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004).
For another good account that helps to contextualize the case in both historical and jurispru-
dential terms, see Bray Hammond, The Bank Cases, in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED THE
CONSTITUTION 30, 37 (John A. Garraty ed., rev. ed. 1988).
31 See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (on Anti-Federalism and backlash
jurisprudence).
35 "Madison's argument rested on a theory of interpretation that would later be called
originalism." Farber, supra note 33, at 38; see infra note 46 and accompanying text (on
strict construction).
36 For an excellent account and analysis, see Richard J. Dougherty, Thomas Jefferson and
the Rule of Law: Executive Power and American Constitutionalism, 28 N. Ky. L. REV. 513,
513 (2001) (focusing on "the apparent disjunction between Jefferson's professed views on
the Constitution in the first decade of the new government, and the actions he subsequently
took as President in the first decade of the nineteenth century."). This seeming disunity is
seen in its-most stark fashion, perhaps, in the events and arguments surrounding the Louisi-
ana Purchase in 1803 (as compared to his "strict" and "originalist" arguments to oppose the
Bank proposed by Hamilton); see also generally, EVERETT BROWN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE (1920) (providing a more comprehensive account
focused on the Purchase itself).
" See infra notes 40 and 42 and accompanying text (on Madison's oscillations regarding
constitutional meanings).
38 For an important example of this "originalist" dishonesty, see Meese, supra note 13.
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ings.3 9 Notably, by then the Framers (and their contemporaries) did not talk up
what they respectively thought they (or others) had originally intended, or
could claim retroactively that they had once intended. Or really, really believed
that they remembered they intended.
Instead, they talked more about experience than about intent: their collec-
tive, cumulative experience as a nation, a people. They took a forward-looking
approach incorporating cumulative experience into their understanding of the
text's meaning, rather than a backward-looking focus on arguable and manipu-
lable constructions of "intent" attributed to a few men years earlier, including
many then still alive and politically active. Specifically, they debated the sig-
nificance of their national experience, both with and without a Bank of the
United States, to help them determine whether the Constitution's literal text
granted this power to the federal government; in particular, Madison - often-
times viewed as the principal Framer - changed his mind about the meaning of
the unchanged words during this span of time, later finding it necessary to
explain this still-delicious inconsistency.4 °
As reflected in the McCulloch ruling, during this time the founding gener-
ation said something like:
You know, our experience with the First Bank, followed by the "embarrassments" we
suffered as a country when it lapsed, showed us that we really need this kind of
instrument. So, whatever the document's succinct passages could be interpreted to
mean, they should be interpreted to mean what we've learned - based on national
experience - that it should mean. Which is, yeah, the federal government does have
the power to establish a corporation - even though it isn't a specifically enumerated
power.41
In this second round of interpretation, even Madison agreed - publicly! Bingo,
done; what's next?
By repeated choices of action and overall example, the Framers of the
federal Constitution demonstrated that they never intended so-called original
intent/s to be deified, nor society and its Constitution to become ossified, on
that superficial basis. On the contrary, their example shows that comparative
human experience and its accumulation, and its critical interpretation and rein-
terpretation, are useful and legitimate sources of constitutional principles and
meanings. Originalism, as posited and bandied about these days, is not an
accurate reflection of history; it is a sloppy conglomeration of opportunistic and
self-serving assertions amounting to a constitutional hoax, a Big Lie deployed
strategically and tactically to help roll back individual rights and liberties in the
" "There is no denying the importance of McCulloch v. Maryland .... Many scholars
consider it the single most important opinion in the [Supreme] Court's history." Farber,
supra note 33, at 33; see also McCulloch, 17 U.S. 316, and sources cited therein (on the
factual and political background of the case).
40 This inconsistency is delicious not per se, but because of the opportunity it provides us to
watch Madison's hair-splitting somersaults to harmonize his flip-flops. See, e.g., LEGISLA-
TIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES 40, 594, 779 (Y. M.
St. Clair Clarke & D. A. Hall eds., 1832) (tracing Madison's changes of mind, including his
response to the "charge of inconsistency"); see also JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE
CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 71-92 (1999) (focusing on
Madison).
41 See McCulloch. 17 U.S. 316.
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name of the Constitution and its drafters. These deployments are calculated to
freeze American law and society into the image of the 1790s.4 2 So, the stakes
are high: next time a student or colleague utters this whopper of a Big Lie,
invoke some of this suppressed yet accessible knowledge to correct the error
gently but surely.
B. Strict Construction as Valid Canon or Principled Method of
Constitutional Interpretation
The second Big Lie is related closely to the first: that "strict construction"
is a legitimate, if not the most legitimate, approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion. By "strict construction," I mean the bundle of arguments urging that con-
stitutional ambiguities should be resolved, as a matter of law, against a finding
of federal power and in favor of a finding for "states rights" - at least whenever
issues of vertical federalism are said to arise.4 3 This strictness is said to safe-
guard local control of community life, which is said to be an important demo-
cratic value of American constitutionalism.44 This argument would seem a
tough sell, especially after we recall what local "communities" did with (or to)
local minorities and vulnerable groups, like people of color, women, children,
and disabled persons, until the federal government was finally aroused into
remedial action; these historical examples illustrate how local hegemonies tend
42 See infra notes 78-88 and accompanying text (on the Alien and Sedition era of the
1790s). Today, in keeping with the identity-driven objectives of the culture wars, this reac-
tion and retrenchment revolves around several recurrent themes: elimination of affirmative
action across the board; restriction of immigration from non-white societies; reduction of
even minimal "safety-net" benefits to the poor, and especially to the immigrant poor; con-
striction of women's reproductive rights, including prohibition of abortion; deactivation of
environmental safeguards; and de jure exclusion of sexual minorities from the "tent" of
formal equality. This backlash agenda, conversely, simultaneously seeks enactment of
English-supremacy laws, and of tax cuts, subsidies, and rebates for wealthy corporations,
groups, and individuals, and of myriad other social and economic proposals that foreseeably,
if not intentionally, serve to shore up the social, cultural, political, and economic value of
being a white, male, heterosexual, middle-class heir of earlier, perhaps colonizing, immi-
grants from northwestern Europe. See Francisco Valdes, "We Are Now of the View": Back-
lash Activism, Cultural Cleansing, and the Kulturkampf to Resurrect the Old Deal, 35
SETON HALL L. REV. 1407, 1410-27 (2005) [hereinafter Valdes, "We Are Now of the
View"]. In effect, if not design, the backlash agenda might well be regarded as a campaign
to consolidate the United States as a Euro-heteropatriarchal society. See generally Francisco
Valdes, Identity Maneuvers in Law and Society: Vignettes of a Euro-American Heteropa-
triarchy, 71 UMKC L. REV. 377 (2002) (elaborating Euro-heteropatriarchy); Francisco
Valdes, Unpacking Hetero-Patriarchy: Tracing the Conflation of Sex, Gender and Sexual
Orientation to Its Origins, 8 YALE J.L. & HUM. 161 (1996) (describing some basic tenets of
Euro-heteropatriarchal social ideologies); see also infra note 90 (further elaborating the fore-
seeable, if not calculated, social consequences of this backward-looking methodology).
13 For a searching, contemporary consideration of this historical and current bundle, see
HARRY V. JAFFA, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION: A DISPUTED
QUESTION (1994).
4" For a recent intonation, see the majority opinion in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995) (using the federal judicial power to strike down, for the first time in a half century, an
Act of Congress under the Commerce Clause, which had banned guns from school zones, on
the ground that Congress thereby had improperly infringed on local lawmaking preroga-
tives). For further discussion of backlash opinions echoing this basic point in recent vertical
federalism opinions, see Valdes, "We Are Now of the View", supra note 42, at 1440-45.
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to beget local abuses of democratic ideals.4 5 Nonetheless, the Big Lies persist:
first, originalism calls for a backward-looking approach to "Framers' intent"
(and related historical artifacts) that necessarily tends to privilege "original"
immigrants, and to fix law and society as it looked in the 1790s. Whenever that
Big Lie still allows for doubt, then strict construction stands ready with a call
for reductionist definitions of constitutional text establishing the federal gov-
ernment, which serve to insulate entrenched local supremacies from federal
power, and thus to perpetuate anti-democratic, neocolonial hierarchies.4 6
In theory, strict construction may be seen as plausible and innocuous:
why not? In fact, as we will see in a moment, strict construction has been
altogether a different animal. The two-punch argument presented by the twin
calls to originalism and strict construction is closely associated with backlash
jurisprudence and the culture wars of the past quarter century, which them-
selves are designed to "take back" the sociolegal legacies of the New Deal and
Civil Rights eras.47 This second Big Lie, like the first and others, depends on
ignorance or suppression of key and accessible knowledge.
To begin with the beginning, we must recall and remind others that strict
interpretation as constitutional methodology has been rejected explicitly,
repeatedly, and authoritatively by the Supreme Court in some of the earliest
landmark cases interpreting the Constitution and establishing judicial methods
of interpreting the Constitution. In definitive cases known to all of us, like
Marbury v. Madison,4 8 or McCulloch v. Maryland,4 9 or Gibbons v. Ogden,50
45 These abuses are not limited to identity politics based on familiar fault lines like race,
class, gender, or sexual orientation. Additionally, for instance, they include the manipulation
of the electoral process to entrench minorities as ruling elites based on geography or other
factors and to lend a patina of majoritarian legitimacy to exercises of public power when
none in fact exists. These anti-democratic abuses of public power under the Constitution
prompted the holding in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (striking down Tennessee's
1901 statute skewing state apportionment rules to ensure that rural minorities would domi-
nate urban majorities, and establishing the "one person, one vote" principle to minimize this
sort of "legal" subversion of democracy by other locally-ensconced factions in the future).
46 The conceptual, rhetorical, and political intertwining of these two ideas is reflected in the
excellent collection on constitutional interpretation and American constitutionalism, whose
essays go back and forth between the two concepts, thus illustrating how they have operated
jointly throughout American history. See INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE
OVER ORIGINAL INTENT, supra note 13; see also LYNCH, supra note 40, at 123-39 (on
Madison and his shifting deployments of originalism, strict construction, and related con-
cepts in the context of shifting partisan battles, which in time led to the "withering" of his
once towering authority).
41 See generally Valdes, "We Are Now of the View", supra note 42, at 1407 (surveying the
political, jurisprudential, and doctrinal aspects of the culture wars, in which these and other
Big Lies play a key role); see also infra notes 70-79 (on the culture wars and their sociolegal
objectives). For richer, additional accounts, see DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS (5th ed. 2000); RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S AGENDA: FROM THE NEW DEAL TO THE REA-
GAN ADMINISTRATION (1991); MARTIN H. REDISH, THE FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL
ORDER (1991); HERMAN SCHWARTZ, PACKING THE COURTS: THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN
TO REWRITE THE CONSTITUTION (1988).
48 5 U.S. 137 (1803), in which the Federalist judges, led by the newly-appointed Chief
Justice John Marshall, declared for themselves the power to review the constitutionality of
federal legislative and executive acts - and invalidated the Federalist legislation creating the
commissions in controversy. For background, see JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION:
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the judges of the founding generation were urged to construe the Constitution
strictly, and they said something akin to: "no, that's a bunch of malarkey."
Specifically, Chief Justice Marshall and his colleagues explained, at length, that
the "strict" approach would exert a "baneful influence" on American constitu-
tionalism, incrementally narrowing the scope of federal authority and rendering
the federal Constitution "a splendid bauble" unfit for national self-govern-
ance.5 ' That's the very term they chose - "splendid bauble"52 - Google it, or
Westlaw or Lexis it - you'll find it there. Rejecting the methodology of
"strict" interpretation of the Constitution because it would render the govern-
ment "incompetent" to govern, they opted in those now-iconic opinions for an
approach that, in their words, they called a "fair" or "sound" interpretation.53
Think about that: "strict" vs. "sound." In their first-generation minds, "strict"
equaled unsound, unfair, and incompetent. Yet that's the same bale of bad
goods being peddled to us again, still today. Today's backlashers, itching to
roll back the New Deal and bring back old, neocolonial deals, are peddling in
the collective name of the founding generation the same time-worn assertions
rejected unequivocally by that very generation shortly after the nation's
founding ! 5 4
Five years later, in another early landmark case on the meaning and inter-
pretation of constitutional text, the Justices expounded on this point further,
underscoring the nature of the baneful influence they sought to avert with their
direct and emphatic repudiation of strict construction. Listen to this, and then
go Google it, if necessary to believe it:
THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE Epic STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED
STATES (2002) (elaborating a comprehensive analysis of the life-long animosities and con-
flicts between these two members of the founding generation, and how their relationship
represented a microcosm of the political struggles that framed the founding).
49 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
50 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
51 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421.
52 Id.
53 In a unanimous opinion, authored by Chief Justice John Marshall, the Court juxtaposed
two basic approaches to constitutional interpretation: the "just" or "fair" or "sound"
approach versus the "narrow" or "strict" approach. Opting for the former, those Justices
reasoned that the former would entail a "baneful influence" on the nation due to the "abso-
lute impracticality of maintaining it, without rendering the government incompetent to its
great objects." Id. at 417-18. This rendering has been precisely the goal of every advocate
who interposed these arguments in North American constitutional history. It likewise is the
goal of cultural warfare and backlash activism: disabling the government from its capacity
to reform entrenched social hierarchies established in part by force of law in eras of formal
subordination based on race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and other forms of social
stratification, and that now are structurally entrenched culturally and materially in law and
society. Historically dominant groups now waging backlash kulturkampf calculate, cor-
rectly, that their privilege and dominance vis-A-vis historically subordinated groups is best
preserved, and perhaps amplified, by disabling .the possibility of federal power reform his-
toric injustices that have enriched and empowered them. See Valdes, "We Are Now of the
View", supra note 42, at 1440-44 (discussing federal powers employed historically to dis-
rupt locally entrenched monopolies of power, and the current appointees' diminution of them
through "activist" exercises of the federal judicial review power).
51 Valdes, "We Are Now of the View", supra note 42, at 1440-44.
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Powerful and ingenious minds, taking as postulates that the powers expressly granted
to the government of the Union are to be contracted by construction into the narrow-
est possible compass, and that the original powers of the states are [to be deemed]
retained if any possible construction will retain them, may, by a course of well
digested but refined and metaphysical reasoning founded on these premises, explain
away the constitution of our country, and leave it, a magnificent structure, indeed, to
look at, but totally unfit for use. They may entangle and perplex the understanding,
as to obscure the principles which were before thought quite plain and induce doubts
where, if the mind were to pursue its own course, none would be perceived. In such
a case, it is peculiarly necessary to recur to safe and fundamental principles to sustain
those principles.
55
"Totally unfit for use," they wrote in 1824, just as in 1819 they had written
"incompetent." This unfitness or incompetence is the inevitable result, if not
the intended goal, of the calls to strict construction and related concepts sent
forth periodically by political factions seeking to "entangle and perplex the
understanding, as to obscure the principles which were before thought quite
plain." Incrementally but surely, this approach leaves us with merely a "mag-
nificent structure, indeed, to look at." Perhaps like a "splendid bauble."
Strict construction, the original generation warned us explicitly and repeat-
edly, would "explain away the constitution of our country." Think on that, and
think of things now. Are we there yet?
The sirens of Anti-Federalist strictness - the so-called originalists of today
- effectively beckon us to undo the work of the Framers. These "powerful and
ingenious minds" are hawking bad and dangerous goods - confusing and
"obscuring" the situation. "Don't buy into any of it," the first generation cau-
tioned, both by word and deed. So we've been amply forewarned. And for
most of the nation's history, the warning has sufficed to reject the puzzling
persistence of calls to textualism, strictness, and the like: "It is an inadmissibly
narrow conception of American constitutional law to confine it to the words of
the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them."56
Yet this Big Lie continues to persist, and to be peddled to the unsuspecting, as
if all this formative constitutional history is merely a child's fairy tale, some-
thing to be set aside and forgotten as we are put to sleep from on high.
For example, as applied by today's appointees to the high Court, and
repeatedly throughout the last decade of the twentieth century, strict construc-
tion, and its conceptual cousins, have been used strategically and selectively,
yet quite consistently, to undermine national power under the two principal
clauses of the Constitution employed during the earlier part of the same century
by the federal government's elected branches to protect social, political, and
economic underdogs from ensconced elites: the Commerce Clause of Article I
and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 In fact, time and again during
55 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 222 (1824).,
56 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.
concurring) (invalidating executive seizure of steel mills to maintain military supplies for
Korean War operations).
51 See Valdes, "We Are Now of the View", supra note 42 (summarizing doctrinal sketches
of some key results produced through backlash activism in recent years, and coinciding with
the culture wars); see also generally supra note 42 and sources cited therein (on the jurispru-
dential politics of backlash appointees to federal judgeships).
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the entire past century, elite-identified judges have righteously wielded a fed-
eral power of judicial review, itself never mentioned in the Constitution, to
construe express grants of federal powers strictly and deny legal protection to
consumers, workers, children, and other vulnerable groups; this supreme
hypocrisy, as we all know, led to the infamous 1930s constitutional confronta-
tion between the appointed judges and the elected executive.58 Moreover, even
while continuing to insist on strict construction of the Constitution as part of
their resurrection project, politically-minded judges of these and prior times
have chosen to ignore their affectation for strictness whenever it might prove
inconvenient from their results-oriented perspectives.59 That's when they go
activist (among other times).
Compare, for instance, the targeting of the Commerce Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment for ever-so-strict construction with the indulgent lee-
way given to the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments by the very same political
58 For notable accounts of those times, see WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-1940 (1963); William E. Leuchtenburg, The Origins
of Franklin D. Roosevelt's "Court-Packing" Plan, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 347 (1966). Cf G.
EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000) (elaborating an analysis
that seeks to revise conventional understandings of that period and reactions to it since then).
59 Backlash activism has included the aggressive review of precedent to narrow their civil
rights reach; the heightening of procedural rules to block civil rights claims on technical
grounds; the strict interpretation of legislative initiatives on behalf of civil rights communi-
ties under both principal instruments for doing so - the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment; and, finally, a proactive and unilateral reinterpretation of the
Tenth and Eleventh amendments to expand "states' rights" affirmatively under "fundamental
postulates" based on the personal views and preferences mainly of five Justices. Under
backlash jurisprudence, burdens of evidence and/or rules of procedure are invoked, and then
deployed to shield discrimination from viable claims. Similarly, precedent is critiqued,
ignored and rejected - or manipulated through "creative" distinction - while legislation is
cabined. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs
Fare in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POE'Y J. 547 (2003) (focusing
on judicial bias against plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases); Kevin M. Clermont
& Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ
From Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 947, 947; William B. Gould, IV, The
Supreme Court and Employment Discrimination Law in 1989: Judicial Retreat and Con-
gressional Response, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1485 (1990) (focusing on retrenchment in that key
term of the Supreme Court); Charles R. Lawrence, III, "Justice" or "Just Us": Racism and
the Role of Ideology, 35 STAN. L. REV. 831 (1983) (focusing on race and white Supremacy);
Nancy Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and the Manipulation of
Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321 (1989) (critiquing the interposition of jurisdic-
tional and prudential barriers to deflect civil rights actions); Robert P. Smith, Jr., Explaining
Judicial Lawgivers, 11 FLA. ST.!.U. L. REV. 153 (1983) (surveying techniques of judicial
manipulation of facts and doctrine); C. Keith Wingate, A Special Pleading Rule for Civil
Rights Complaints: A Step Forward or a Step Back?, 49 Mo. L. REV. 677 (1984) (critiquing
the heightened rules of pleading that various federal judges had erected to rebuff civil rights
claimants). These and similar practices have prompted various scholars to question the prin-
cipled nature of their opinions. See supra note 42 and sources cited therein (on backlash
politics through backlash activism). Their basic conclusions were more recently corrobo-
rated by a study of the cases argued during the 2002 Supreme Court Term. See Theodore W.
Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science
Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150
(2004); see also Peter J. Smith, supra note 17 (reporting same results from another empirical
study of today's judges).
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judges who so loudly demand strictness as holy principle. You might be sur-
prised; you will find no strictness of construction when you turn to those favor-
ite Amendments of today's backlashers; no, you will find, instead, wildly
activist, over-the-top interpretative extravagance. You will find today's
backlashing judges telling us, as they alternate from mighty gyration to con-
clusory assertion and misleading mischaracterization of law and fact (and with
an apparently straight face), that the pithy text of those two Amendments to the
original document does not mean what it says, not even their plainly plain
text.6 o
The knowledge suppressed to enable this Big Lie includes, more broadly,
the sleazy intellectual and political histories of strict interpretation (and related
concepts) in action, and over the span of the nation's entire lifetime. These
histories, taken as a whole, show how the project behind these concepts is
nakedly and relentlessly ideological. Time and again, we see these concepts
being taken up and tried out, strategically or tactically, by political factions
fearing that federal power would trump their own. When no longer useful, the
battle-cry fades away, or is turned on its head, ei la Jefferson and Madison.
The story begins, of course, with the original American political struggle -
the ratification of the Constitution. The folks known as the Anti-Federalists
deployed these arguments against the folks known as the Federalists to attempt
a defeat of the Constitution's ratification. 6 1 They lost. Yet these concepts were
shortly later revived by Madison and Jefferson as a temporary political conve-
nience to counter Hamilton's influence over Federal policymaking in the Wash-
ington administrations. But the argument itself lost again, on the merits, so to
speak, after the Constitution's implementation, during the debates of the found-
ing generation over the Bank of the United States, as we just saw in the form of
the McCulloch case. And then this pattern of political ping-pong continued,
and continues still.
Coupled to the equally empty claim of "states' rights," unprincipled but
catchy slogans based on these terms have stood ready ever since to be re-tooled
for tactical maneuvers in constitutional moments.6 2 These terms and ideas
became favorite themes of fervent slave owners and racists in the antebellum
I For a good sampler of originalist pronouncements in recent cases, see O'NEILL, supra
note 12, at 205-12 (reviewing some key 1990s culture war cases); see also Valdes, "We Are
Now of the View", supra note 42 (discussing federal powers in recent vertical federalism
cases interpreting these two clauses).
61 For a compilation of Anti-Federalist dogma and related texts, see THE ANTI-FEDERALIST
PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986). For a
fascinating study of the rhetoric used by both sides during the ratification process, see WIL-
LIAM H. RIKER, THE STRATEGY OF RHETORIC: CAMPAIGNING FOR THE AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TION 33-48 (1996) (reporting that Anti-Federalist argumentation emphasized negative
themes like national consolidation and encroachment on local liberties, fears now associated
chiefly with originalism, such as strict construction and states' rights, due to fear of a "big"
far-away government); see also Peter J. Smith, supra note 17 (on the present-day reliance of
today's "originalists" on Anti-Federalist slogans and dogmas, as reflected in a recent empiri-
cal study of judicial opinions).
62 For a classic exposition, see CHARLES J. BLOCH, STATES' RIGHTS: THE LAW OF THE
LAND (1958). For a summary overview of "states' rights" sloganeering, and its relationship




South bent on keeping their grip on their plantations and privileges. Similarly,
in the last century this same set of constitutional slogans was trotted out for
political recirculation by pro-Apartheid segregationists and Jim Crow white
supremacists, still fearing federal interference with entrenched slave-based sys-
tems of stratification, exploitation, and oppression nearly a century after the
Civil War and the Reconstruction Amendments supposedly settled that "origi-
nal" mess. 63 And, as you know, Big Business and its judicial and political
allies liked it, too, interposing the same basic arguments to constrain federal
regulation of their economic domination and voracious plunder of the nation
during the heyday of the Industrial Revolution as the nineteenth century turned
into the twentieth. 64 This bundle of concepts has been used by judicial appoin-
tees to frustrate federal and state legislative policy aimed not only at ensuring
equal protection of the law for every person, but also specifically attempting to
protect Americans from economic exploitation and social subjugation based
original compromises or betrayals, or due to geographic location, individual
identity or social status. National history and experience teach that these con-
cepts in practice operate chiefly as tools to undermine or undo both democracy
and justice.
Indeed, it took multiple electoral landslides in congressional and executive
elections for the New Deal to emerge in the late 1930s from the ruins of the
decades-long drive by judges and politicians to suffocate democratically con-
ceived policy-making at the state and national level with their selective invoca-
tion of these (and related) slogans.65 This oft-discredited constellation of now-
familiar constitutional jingles has continue/d to percolate as ready-made and
nifty-sounding arguments. Before and during the past century, local yet pow-
erful factions hoping to deflect federal disturbance of their unjust lock on soci-
ety, and their loss of the myriad material perks that come with it, have
resurrected these jingles and arguments strategically and tactically, as the cul-
ture wars and the Big Lies of today's backlashers make so evident in our own
time.66 Today, the parallel stories of "strict construction" and "states' rights"
continue in tandem with the latest iterations of originalism, both ideologically
and doctrinally, to perform the same stratifying functions as always.67
63 For an interesting example, see EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST GOVERNMENT:
THE RISE, FLOWERING AND DECLINE OF A FAMOUS JUDICIAL CONCEPT (1948); see also gen-
erally THE TENTH AMENDMENT AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY: CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES (Mark R. Killenbeck ed., 2002) (presenting a recent collection of
essays on these issues and topics).
I The obstructions employed various legal fictions and constitutional inventions, including
ideas or terms linked to strict construction, states' rights, and originalism. Somewhat ironi-
cally, this obstructionism generally came to be associated with "Lochnerism" after the Jus-
tices' infamous turn-of-the-century opinion in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
(invoking "economic" substantive due process to prevent a state legislature from establishing
a maximum of sixty working hours weekly, or ten daily, for bakers).
65 See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (on the efforts of judicial appointees to
prevent enactment of the New Deal under the banner of strict construction and related
concepts).
66 See infra notes 70-77 and accompanying text (on the dominance of these concepts as
refashioned in recent decades through the practices of backlash politics and jurisprudence via
the ongoing culture wars).
67 See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (on the intertwining of these concepts).
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Thus, the constitutional, political, and legal histories of this Big Lie teach
that "strict construction" in action boils down to a calculated constriction of the
powers of the federal government in particular ways toward particular ends;
specifically during the past century, history shows strict construction (and
related concepts) to be a tool used chiefly to undercut in practice the formal
commitment to equal opportunity and equal justice as constitutional values of
American nationhood. Apart from "political practice" and strategic argumenta-
tion, history shows that there never has been anything like strict judicial con-
struction of the Constitution;6 8 there has only been a constricting construction
of particular clauses for particular ends - like the Commerce Clause, Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and other text protecting individual civil liber-
ties against the demands of economic and ideological elites. Next time some-
body ignorantly sounds this platitudinous call, explain patiently why and how
history has shown us that Chief Justice Marshall and his founding colleagues
were prescient in their concern over that idea's predictably "baneful influ-
ence."69 Tell a known and documented yet suppressed truth: as practiced, both
historically and presently, strict construction (and its cousins) amounts to just a
Big Lie.
C. Backlash Kulturkampf and Raw Majoritarianism as American-Style
Democracy
Want another Big Lie? Am I getting across that Jerome feeling? I'm try-
ing to. Okay, here's another that works as context and vehicle for the promo-
tion and inculcation of the prior two: cultural warfare as a garden-variety or
legitimate form of democratic politics in this particular republic under this par-
ticular Constitution. By cultural warfare I refer of course to the backlash cam-
paigns that, since the 1960s and 1970s, have railed against anything labeled
"liberal" or associated with the New Deal or with Civil Rights. 70 A core tactic
68 See generally LAURENCE TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT: How THE CHOICE
OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES SHAPES OUR HISTORY 41-49 (1985) (on the "myth of the strict
constructionist.").
69 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
70 The thoughts outlined in this section reflect nearly a decade of attention to this phenome-
non. See Francisco Valdes, Culture, "Kulturkampf" and Beyond: The Antidiscrimination
Principle Under the Jurisprudence of Backlash, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW
AND SOCIETY 271 (Austin Sarat ed., 2004) (focusing broadly on three theoretical perspec-
tives - backlash jurisprudence, liberal legalisms, and critical outsider jurisprudence - to
compare their approaches to equality law and policy); Francisco Valdes, Afterword - Cul-
ture by Law: Backlash as Jurisprudence, 50 VILL. L. REV. 1135 (2005) (focusing on back-
lash interventions in liberty-privacy jurisprudence); Francisco Valdes, Anomalies, Warts and
All: Four Score of Liberty, Privacy and Equality, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1341 (2004) [hereinafter
Valdes, Anomalies] (focusing specifically on Lawrence v. Texas and generally on liberty-
privacy as a central doctrinal terrain of social and legal retrenchment); Francisco Valdes,
Afterword - Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory: Majoritarianism, Mul-
tidimensionality, and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship, or Legal Scholars as Cul-
tural Warriors, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1409 (1998) (focusing on the implications of cultural
warfare for sexual orientation scholarship specifically, and for all OutCrit scholars gener-
ally); Valdes, "We Are Now of the View", supra note 42, at 1407 (surveying the political,
jurisprudential and doctrinal aspects of the culture wars, in which these and other Big Lies
play a key role).
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in this social and ideological warfare is the relentless depiction of New Deal
and Civil Rights policy choices as illegitimate concoctions of power-hungry
Justices that somehow robbed the nation of its democratic options, although in
fact most of the New Deal and Civil Rights laws - such as the antitrust, labor,
civil rights, voting rights, and employment rights statutes of those eras, are
quintessentially democratic. They are, in other words, Acts of multiple Con-
gresses, signed into law by a series of Presidents, all of course elected demo-
cratically. Backlashers also promote this fantastical depiction of our recent
national heritage despite the irony that the New Deal itself was the victim of
juridical concoctions displacing democratic lawmaking in the name of the very
doctrines today's backlashers now seek to resurrect through cultural warfare, or
"kulturkampf." Under this Orwellian version of reality, today's judicial
appointees righteously displace not only the precedents of their jurisprudential
predecessors, but also the democratic, cumulative lawmaking legacies of New
Deal and Civil Rights generations, Congresses, and Presidents - and, to boot, in
the name of "democracy"!
Setting its cynically fantastical nature momentarily aside, the underlying
concept of this Big Lie is that judicially-mandated vindications of constitutional
promises are illegitimate unless the majority goes along with the vindication
and, conversely, that (practically) anything goes so long as the majority really
likes it (or, alternatively, some Justice pronounces that the Framers woulda
liked it). The unspoken and untenable premise of this Big Lie, then, is that
"democratic" breaches or delays of constitutional promises are legitimized by
majoritarian preference or consent. This coarse and audacious idea goes some-
thing like this: "Hey, we all voted; you lost; it was fair." That's democracy,
American style!
The lie here begins with the premise that the Constitution makes majori-
tarianism a sufficient justification for virtually any result produced politically;
this Big Lie asks us to presume that the Constitution provides a license for
majorities to do as they wish with the rest of us - sometimes, even a "presumed
majority" will do for self-styled originalist judicial appointees, as the willful
bare majority in the culture wars case of Bowers v. Hardwick expressly did in
1986 to endorse the oppressive and selective enforcement of a general statute
These works, in turn, inform and are informed by related concerns or issues that form
part of my larger scholarly agenda. See Francisco Valdes, Outsider Jurisprudence, Critical
Pedagogy and Social Justice Activism: Marking the Stirrings of Critical Legal Education,
10 AsIAN L.J. 65 (2003) [hereinafter Critical Legal Education]; Francisco Valdes, Identity
Maneuvers in Law and Society: Vignettes of a Euro-American Heteropatriarchy, 71 UMKC
L. REV. 377 (2002); Francisco Valdes, Insisting on Critical Theory in Legal Education:
Making Do While Making Waves, 12 LA RAZA L.J. 137 (2001); Francisco Valdes, Race,
Ethnicity and Hispanismo in Triangular Perspective: The "Essential Latinalo" and LatCrit
Theory, 48 UCLA L. REV. 305 (2000); Francisco Valdes, Outsider Scholars, Legal Theory
and OutCrit Perspectivity: Postsubordination Vision as Jurisprudential Method, 49
DEPAUL L. REV. 831 (2000); Francisco Valdes, Afterword - Theorizing "OutCrit" Theo-
ries: Coalitional Method and Comparative Jurisprudential Experience - RaceCrits, Queer-
Crits and LatCrits, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1265 (1999); Francisco Valdes, Queer Margins,
Queer Ethics: A Call to Account for Race and Ethnicity in the Law, Theory and Politics of
"Sexual Orientation", 48 HASrINGS L.J. 1293 (1997); Francisco Valdes, Sex and Race in
Queer Legal Culture: Ruminations on Identities and Inter-Connectivities, 5 S. CAL. REV. L.
& WOMEN'S STUD. 25 (1995).
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against a particular minority.7 ' To swallow this Big Lie we therefore must first
pretend to believe that democracy and majoritarianism are synonymous. We
also must forget that the Constitution was enacted originally (in great measure)
to counter the "tyranny of the majority."72 Similarly, we must overlook the
increasingly egregious violation and manipulation of voting rights in this coun-
try since at least 2000.7 3 Finally, we must blind ourselves to the ways in which
cultural warfare in fact operates today - as the very opposite of a working
democracy in a plural society committed constitutionally to equal opportunity
and justice."4 We must, in short, ignore or suppress known truths. But it's
difficult, as well as dishonest, given the circumstances and knowledge at hand.
Recent experience shows these ongoing culture wars to be an elite-driven,
majoritarian campaign to amass power in the pursuit of reclaiming lost privi-
71 See, e.g., Valdes, Anomalies, supra note 70, at 1377-82 (elaborating this point, and quot-
ing the passage on "presumed" majorities and the constitutionality of statutes).
72 From their original perspective, the Federalists considered raw majoritarianism as a form
of "democratic despotism" akin to monarchical despotism - a perspective formed in the
crucible of both the revolutionary period in the 1770s as well as the critical period immedi-
ately afterward, spanning the 1780s. During this period of sovereignty, the legislatures of
the autonomous former colonies, usually elected directly by the eligible voters of the state,
enacted statutes that disturbed the property claims of the revolutionary elites - and that
helped to prompt the energy they put behind the new Constitution's adoption. This experi-
ence with the "tyranny of the majority" caused James Madison and other key Framers to
emphasize "deliberative democracy" as a check on mob rule in the name of majoritarian
prerogative. In this way, the propertied local and national elites of the first generation
became the first "minority" to seek constitutional protection from the dictates of rampant
(from their perspective) formal democracy. In this way, they set both the stage and the
example for succeeding minorities, including those under attack via raw majoritarianism
mechanisms in today's backlash kulturkampf. E.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James
Madison) (discussing the problems they perceived with direct democracy); see also,
GOP-DON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, 393-417 (1969)
(describing this "Critical Period" of direct democracy or "democratic despotism" leading up
to the Constitutional Convention).
73 See infra note 106 and accompanying text (on the theft of the 2000 elections); see also
Valdes, "We Are Now of the View", supra note 42, at 1438-40 (providing capsule summa-
ries of some 1990s voting rights cases in which backlash appointees used the federal judicial
review power to unravel democratic lawmaking, in the form of the Voting Rights Act of
1965, as well as undoing established principles and precedents).
14 E.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002)
(evaluating the current Justices' manipulation or disregard of precedent and canons of inter-
pretation in pursuit of their anti-anti-discrimination political agenda). Many scholars have
drawn similar observations in recent years. See, e.g., Keith Aoki, The Scholarship of Recon-
struction and the Politics of Backlash, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1467 (1996); Kimberl6 W. Cren-
shaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331 (1988); Owen Fiss, The Forms of Justice,
93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1979) (noting that the nation was and is "in the midst of a counter-
revolution; not because we are at the verge of a new discovery, but because the discovery of
an earlier era is now in jeopardy"); Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination
Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN.
L. REV. 1049 (1978); Kenneth L. Karst, Religion, Sex, and Politics: Cultural Counterrevo-
lution in Constitutional Perspective, 24 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 677 (1991) (elaborating a rela-
tively early analysis of the phenomena now known as backlash kulturkampf and
jurisprudence); Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legitimation of Sex Discrimination: A Critical
Response to Supreme Court Jurisprudence, 63 OR. L. REV. 265 (1984).
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lege. 75 These culture wars are waged through three "prongs" of politicking,
each aimed at the judicial and/or political branches of the federal government.76
But the objective is not a simple capture of power, as all factions are wont to
do. The prize in this instance is no less than control of public power to remake
American society and entrench factional supremacy. These culture wars are
waged not only as a means of rough-and-tumble backlash politics, but as a
means of outwitting democracy in the name of democracy - a push to circum-
vent or shut down the mechanisms put in place by the Constitution to avert the
possibility of perpetual single-faction rule.7 7
To find an apt analog for this ambitious backlash effort we might go back,
once again, to the experiences of the original generation. Do you recall the
Federalists' Alien and Sedition Acts, which also were formally democratic yet
nakedly political abuses of public power for factional advancement and
entrenchment? 78 As you might recall, the Adams administrations had squan-
dered much of the goodwill that the Federalists, whether deserved or not, in
fact had garnered through their stewardship of armed revolution and national
politics under George Washington. When their hold on power seemed
electorally threatened, they abused their formal public powers to make up nefa-
rious laws like these two, designed to appear legitimate but calculated to disad-
vantage the opposition, and thus to tighten the incumbents' grip on public
power and its personal privileges. Going dutifully through the motions and
rituals of formal democracy as if a photo opportunity, they pursued anti-demo-
cratic goals and politics. In the name of liberty, security, and democracy, they
unsettled all three.
Wielding their newly-bootstrapped powers under these statutes with an
apparent sense of factional doom and personal desperation, Federalist politi-
71 The declaration of cultural warfare issued formally, and perhaps most conspicuously,
from Republican Presidential contender Patrick Buchanan during his address to the 1992
Republican National Convention, announcing a new campaign for the "soul of America"
through which these self-denominated cultural warriors of retrenchment intended to "take
back.., our cities, and take back our culture and take back our country ... block by block."
See Chris Black, Buchanan Beckons Conservatives to Come "Home", BOSTON GLOBE, Aug.
18, 1992, at A12; Paul Galloway, Divided We Stand: Today's "Cultural War" Goes Deeper
than Political Slogans, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 28, 1992, at DI; see generally JAMES DAVISON
HUNTER, BEFORE THE SHOOTING BEGINS: SEARCHING FOR DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA'S CUL-
TURE WAR (1994); JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE
AMERICA (1991). Since then, this social conflict has been waged with a vengeance to "take
back" the civil rights gains of the past century in the name of the "angry white male." See
Grant Reeher & Joseph Cammarano, In Search of the Angry White Male: Gender, Race and
Issues in the 1994 Elections, in MIDTERM: THE ELECTIONS OF 1994 IN CONTEXT 125 (Philip
A. Klinkner ed., 1996).
76 See supra note 74 and sources cited therein (on cultural warfare).
71 See Valdes, "We Are Now of the View", supra note 42 (surveying the origins, objectives
and tactics of cultural warfare); see also supra notes 74 and 75 and sources cited therein (on
cultural warfare).
78 For an illuminating account, see JOHN C. MILLER, CRISIS IN FREEDOM: THE ALIEN AND
SEDITION ACTS 3-54 (1951) (recounting the passage of the bills by the Federalists in control
of Congress); see also JAMES MORTON SMITH: FREEDOM'S FETTERS: THE ALIEN AND SEDI-
TION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES 94-187 (1956) (sketching the domestic and
international political contexts for the passage of these statutes, and the patterns of enforce-
ment that created "hunters and hunted.").
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cians, judges, and agents intimidated dissenting journalists, harassed opposing
voters or politicians, and generally suppressed democracy as much as their for-
mally lawful control of public power permitted. Much like now, they used
every tool under their control, including the resources of the political branches,
to enact and enforce tyrannical statutes, and they used their control of the judi-
cial branch to declare the laws legitimate and pronounce their enforcement of
them constitutional. Their uses (and misuses) of public authority for personal
or factional political gain set off formative struggles over constitutional mean-
ing and governance in the new republic,7 9 struggles whose themes continue to
reverberate, here and now, in the form of the backlash agenda that fuels the
current culture wars.
The first of these notorious enactments, the Alien Act, was one of this
nation's earliest anti-immigrant actions. It purported, among other things, to
authorize the Executive's deportation of non-citizens whom he judged danger-
ous to the "peace and safety" of the United States, and to otherwise punish or
imprison defiant deportees. 80 The Federalists' enforcement of their new statute
reflected their "conviction that the root of all the evil in the United States was
the large foreign-born population. Here was the chief source of opposition to
the government . . . the recruiting ground of the democrats."'8' "[T]hey
attempted, under the guise of patriotism, of concern for the national welfare,
and of 'saving the country from internal enemies' to break up the [opposition]
party" led by Jefferson and Madison.82 But "nationalism alone was not enough
to save them: ill-equipped to be the leaders of a people that aspired to move
toward democracy, the Federalists in 1798 acted out of fear of the people which
was never far from the surface of their minds and which underlay many of their
measures. '"83 "By yielding to the temptation to proscribe, under cover of a war
emergency, their political opponents as enemies of the country, the Federalist
party in effect confessed its unworthiness to lead the nation at a time of tension
and peril."84 That was 1798. Now is 2006. Sound familiar?
The second statute, the Sedition Act, was the first's bookend, and might
remind some of you of the so-called USA Patriot Act, enacted five years ago
this very month with similar hysteria and suspect motives.85 Tracking some
79 See, e.g., H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, in INTER-
PRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 75-91, supra note 13
(reviewing these developments in more detail); see also supra notes 13 and sources cited
therein (on this basic theme, from various perspectives).
80 MILLER, supra note 78, at 50-53.
81 Id. at 41.
82 Id. at 3-4.
83 Id. at 10.
84 Id.
85 For an especially incisive analysis, see David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953
(2002) (reviewing the pattern of egregious regard for law and due process embodied in the
statute and its current enforcement); see also Fletcher N. Baldwin, Jr. & Robert B. Shaw,
Down to the Wire: Assessing the Constitutionality of the National Security Agency's War-
rantless Wiretapping Program: Exit the Rule of Law, 17 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 429
(2006) (reviewing this aspect of the current abuses of power for political advantage, and
concluding that "worst of all, the NSA program is an unchecked exercise of executive
power"); Peter Irons, "The Constitution is Just a Scrap of Paper": Empire Versus Democ-
racy, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1081 (2005) (surveying the statute's effects and noting how some
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standard ploys of insecure or maniacal rulers, this statute criminalized, among
other things, any written or verbal communication uttered with the "intent to
create a belief in the citizens of [the United States] ... that the Legislature (or
President or any Court or Judge of the United States) was induced [to act] by
motives hostile to the Constitution, or liberties and happiness of the people" of
the United States. "Congressional action against sedition, therefore, supple-
mented the Federalists' measures against foreigners .... The capstone of the
internal security program of the Federalist party was the Sedition Law."86
These two laws, moreover, were accompanied by similar enactments that
employed public power to manipulate domestic electoral politics - democracy,
in other words - and ensconce the Federalist elite in perpetual power. During
their relatively brief time on top, the Federalists passed numerous statutes
directed at "aliens" and "enemies" and "sedition" with the intention of prevent-
ing new immigrants from becoming voters, preventing existing citizens from
exercising their constitutional and civil rights, and entrenching a formally dem-
ocratic monopoly over the federal government. Indeed, "[t]he Federalist sys-
tem of political intolerance was inaugurated by the Naturalization Act of
1798, ' '87 which continued to bedevil this country with its racist xenophobia for
a very, very long time to come.88
Under these twin "laws" (and their related statutes), I could be arrested
and imprisoned, here and now, for tle words I utter today in this Lecture. So
could the many writers who have helped to expose the corruption and trans-
gressions of the current occupants of the Executive Branch and their cohorts in
other branches or quarters of the government.89 Perhaps, so could many of
you. Is this democracy? Liberty? The Rule of Law?
This fear, this oppression, this effect, is a key aim of cultural warfare
today - just as it was the point of the Federalist equivalents back then: abuse of
democratic institutions to subvert democracy "legally" and fix society in the
mold and image preferred by its elitist rulers.9 ° Remember, the Framers of the
provisions, like the vague criminalization of acts "dangerous to human life," imitate the
Sedition Act of the doomed Federalists two centuries ago); see also infra notes 95-96 and
accompanying text (on "patriotism" as used in this statute, and how that usage constitutes
another Big Lie that facilitates state-sponsored intimidation of dissent or opposition to the
"legal" subversion of democracy by ruling politicians).
86 SMiTH, supra note 78, at 94, 108; U.S. SENATE JOURNAL, 5th Cong., 2nd Sess. (July 4,
1798).
87 Id. at 22.
88 From the very beginning of the federal legislation on naturalization, starting with the first
statute in 1790 a few months after the Constitution's ratification, Congress limited naturali-
zation to "any alien, being a free white person who shall have resided within the limits and
under the jurisdiction of the United States for a term of two years." Naturalization Act, ch.
3, §1, 1 Stat. 103 (1790). This whites-only provision endured for 162 years, until 1952. See
generally IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 20-24
(2006) (providing capsule history of legal definitions of whiteness in various doctrinal
categories).
89 See infra note 118 and sources cited therein (on the fraud, deception, and profiteering of
the current regime).
90 Because constitutional text is infamously brief, abstract, and ambiguous, the backlash
search for specific text is usually negative. Moreover, by employing the most exacting or
restrictive approach specifically to text granting federal powers, backlashing originalists help
to ensure a negative outcome via this methodology. On the structuring of methodology
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Constitution deeply distrusted each other and understood that they were all
going to act like self-interested politicians organized around self-aggrandizing
factions - a prophecy they all personally fulfilled, albeit in different ways and
times, and to varying degrees. 9 They concluded that there was no escape from
this bottom line, and the only question for them therefore was how to control
the tendency "to vex and oppress" each other in the pursuit of self-interest, to
use Madison's apt phrase.92 Consequently, they set about to erect a system of
factional politics that would be self-correcting through electoral contests most
of the time, and that would contain structural separations of power, coupled
with specific checks and balances on all sources of power, to ensure that "ambi-
tion would counteract ambition" regardless of shifting factional fortunes.93
And by the way, these Federalist Acts cannot be viewed as expressions or
evidence of "original intent" regarding the constitutionality of the powers pur-
portedly self-bestowed by these (and related) statutes. And this is so even
though two towering Framers and founders - and, at that time, the nation's
during the ratification process to secure preferred results, see RIKER, supra note 61 at 129-
265 (reviewing the ratification campaigns in several key states, and the structuring of the
process as whole by the Federalists to tilt matters in favor of success). Using entrenched
power, status, and wealth amassed during the decades and generations of de jure patriarchy
and white supremacy, the identity-based in-groups established by the original immigrants
thus are able structurally to influence inordinately formally "democratic" contests upon
which genuine constitutionalism depends.
Consequently, the social and cultural effects of this methodology serve more often than
not to privilege "original" arrangements emplaced throughout society at large based on
social identities and ownership of property. These arrangements of course favored the prop-
ertied white male elites of the colonial period, which, indeed, were "the people" permitted to
participate fully in the political decision-making processes used during those times to impose
the social, economic, and political structures that, now, are hallowed strategically by
backlashers as neutral kinds of history and tradition to wage cultural warfare against the
"traditionally" subordinated groups of this country. See supra note 30 and sources cited
therein (on suffrage and political participation in country's formative years). Thus,
"originalism" and related concepts become code terms for past and self-serving choices
regarding "values" that backlashers now say bind us all in perpetuity, both formally and
structurally, regardless of the constitutional lessons that later generations might draw, as did
the Framers, from social experience or evolution. For a further discussion of Framers' adap-
tation of views from the revolutionary to the "critical" period, which caused them to struc-
ture "democracy" in fundamentally different terms as a result of the lessons they drew from
the latter period, see supra notes 26-71 and accompanying text. Over time, the most likely
(if not inevitable) social and cultural consequences of backlash methodology are to reverse
multiculturalism in the distribution of social goods and formal powers, and revert to a more
homogenized structuring of power - an artificial homogeneity that, despite conclusory back-
lash claims to the contrary, are formally at odds with the formal commitment to equal justice
and equal opportunity.
91 A faction stood for no principles; it was held together by the pre-eminence of a
leader and the hope of plunder and rapine. It was a union of the vicious, the base and
ignorant under the leadership of the unprincipled. And, as Hamilton said, faction was
the "natural disease of popular governments" and accounted for the shortness of their
life-expectancy.
MILLER, supra note 78, at 11.
92 See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 55 (James Madison) (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.,
Martino Publishing, 2001) (noting that the structure of the U.S. government must be one of
checks and balances).
93 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 118 (James Madison) (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., Martino
Publishing, 2001) ("Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.").
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only two Presidents, Adams and Washington - both blessed this desperate and
doomed power grab: had the Constitution been presented as vesting these sorts
of powers in the new national government - the partisan criminalization of
political expression and ideological exclusion or deportation of potential oppo-
sition voters - the Anti-Federalists would have prevailed hands down. No,
these (and related) Acts do not and cannot stand as legitimate precedent for
similar present-day abuses in the name of operational necessity. By historical
consensus, these (and similar) Acts of anti-democratic, majoritarian, and fac-
tional abuse stand as a scandalous betrayal of first principles, a repudiated
experience from which the nation must learn and re-learn foundational lessons,
just as the Framers studied and learned fundamentals from their own exper-
iences, and those of others.94
From a truly original (as opposed to originalist) constitutional perspective,
anything that excites factional greed and the pursuit of self-interest through
public politics to the point where the substantive and structural safeguards of
the Constitution are effectively deactivated must be regarded at least as suspect.
The circumvention of the Constitution through disingenuous technicality will
render it a "splendid bauble" - "unfit" and "incompetent" to the systemic tasks
for which it was composed and adopted. This much was true in 1789 and 1798,
and it remains true in 2006. Merely because a particular faction or group of
factions can claim to control "a majority" at any given moment does not change
this bedrock fact, at least not from a constitutional perspective.
Therefore, do not let yourself be kidded into complacency. The waging of
cultural warfare, of backlash kulturkampf, is not the practice of democracy,
even if superficially it might, kinda, seem like it. It is not business as usual.
And raw majoritarianism is not the form of government established by this
Constitution. On the contrary, the structural safeguards of that document -
including features like separation of powers, checks and balances, and the Elec-
toral College - are all designed to problematize majoritarianism, to disrupt the
equation between majorities and winners - to avoid, in the worst-case scenario,
mob rule instigated by unscrupulous, unprincipled demagogues. Whether in
1798 or 2006, political, cultural, or ethnic cleansing is a subversion of the Con-
stitution, even if pursued and accomplished through formally democratic chan-
nels; when conducted for personal or factional political gain or enrichment, it is
downright despicable.
Next time somebody intones simplistic claims of "democracy" to justify
today's despotism and cronyism, try out a bit of (principled) originalism.
Revive this kind of forgotten or suppressed history. Drop a timely reminder of
the original constitutional architecture establishing this republic, and of the
compelling, continuing political reasons for this design.
" Along these lines, one bright spot is the recent recognition of these functional fundamen-
tals by the Supreme Court in cases like Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and Lawrence
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). In Romer, majoritarian politicians had sought to exclude a
minority from unfettered participation in the political process on ideological grounds, while
in Lawrence, a majoritarian legislature sought to criminalize a minority and the relationships
of members of that minority. For a discussion of these (potentially) important rulings, see
Francisco Valdes, Anomalies, supra note 70.
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D. Patriotism as Duty of Blind Obedience to the Ruling Class
Should I go on with the Big Lies? So many envelop us ... do we have
time for one more? Okay, how 'bout this one; it's short, and so timely: "patri-
otism" as a name for knee-jerk loyalty and (undue) obedience to ruling elites.
As shown by the passage of the so-called USA Patriot Act in October 2001,
today "patriotism" is repeatedly misused by politicians in control of the Execu-
tive Branch (and their allies) to badger, smear, and destroy anyone who dares to
question their hunger for power and profit through war - to club down any and
all expressions of dissent into silence, whether from members of Congress, the
mainstream media, established academics, or private citizens.95 And of course,
the engineers and biggest culprits in today's smear tactics, the loudest breast-
beating, self-proclaimed "patriots" of us all, are also to be found among the
most privileged evaders or cunning dodgers of military service96 during the
nation's last (undeclared and fraudulent) war. 9 7
91 For a sampler of examples involving authors, actors, musicians and private citizens, see
Susan N. Herman, Patriotic Dissent, 45 WASHBURN L.J. 21, 26 (2005). In this short essay,
the author recounts an emblematic moment, which illustrates the culture of fear and self-
censorship that this campaign of smear and intimidation is designed to produce among eve-
ryday Americans: "My own mother-in-law expressed fear that the government would
attempt to silence me, perhaps locking me up for my dissenting views." Id. at 26. For other
examples, see Frank Rich, It's All Newsweek's Fault, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2005, at § 4-13
(discussing the use of same tactics against mainstream press); see also supra note 85 and
accompanying text (on the USA Patriot Act); Jim Rutenberg, For White House, War of
Words, at Least, Is Battle Where It Excels, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2006, at A21 (reporting on
similar attacks on the patriotism or integrity of members of Congress who dare voice any
dissent); Scott Smallwood, Inside a Free-Speech Firestorm: How a Professor's 3-Year Old
Essay Sparked a National Controversy, CHRON. HIGHER ED., Feb. 18, 2005, at A10 (report-
ing the dismissal of a respected and prominent tenured professor due to an expression of
views on the causes of terrorism, which some politicians had deemed "extreme."). Of
course, the effort to intimidate the press is now made easier by the longer-term assaults on
the media begun under Nixon and Reagan as part of the culture wars. See Valdes, "We Are
Now of the View", supra note 42, at 1433 n.57 and sources cited therein (on Nixon's and
Reagan's handiwork).
96 Though the details seem to have been made deliberately murky, the bottom line is clear:
none of the grown men so ready to send young troops to fight and die overseas ever served a
day in the military during wartime, even thought they could have. Instead, during the Viet-
nam War era most of them scurried to hide in comfortable havens to substitute for their
obligation to serve during that time of compulsory military service based on the draft system
then in place. Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, a veteran, said,
It is interesting to me that many of those who want to rush this country into war and think it
would be so quick and easy don't know anything about war.... They come from an intellectual
perspective versus having sat in jungles or foxholes and watched their friends get their heads
blown off. I try to speak for those ghosts of the past a little bit.
Michael Hirsh, Hawks, Doves and Dubya, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 2, 2002, at 24, 27-28. Of
course, this merely "intellectual perspective" is the result of evading service: "Cheney,
Wolfowitz and Perle all avoided Vietnam - Rumsfeld was a Navy pilot between wars - and
Bush was one of the 'sons of the powerful' whom [former Secretary of State Colin] Powell,
in his 1995 memoirs, condemned" for their habit of "wrangl[ing] slots in Reserve and
National Guard units." Id. Ironically, under their current and unprecedented misuse of the
Reserve and National Guard to stretch military resources, those escape hatches would be
shut today to service dodgers like Bush and Cheney.
97 From origins to collapse, the parallels in executive deception in initiating American mili-
tary hostilities in Vietnam and Iraq are eerie. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The American War in
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This clubbing and smearing in the name of patriotism extends to illegal
wiretapping of private citizens, surveillance of libraries and the means of com-
munication, defamation, harassment, and other official transgressions that are
spookily reminiscent of the Alien and Sedition era (such as immigration exclu-
sions based on political viewpoint, secret warrantless searches, ethnic profiling,
military tribunals, and "secret preventive detention" at the unilateral discretion
of the executive).9 8 Like the Federalist exertions of the 1790s, these tactics aim
to generate and insinuate a sense of fear and self-censorship among the popu-
lace at large, and to leave undisturbed the thievery and thuggery of their rulers.
Eerily echoing the old Federalist rhetoric of the 1790s, the failed political hack
installed into power at that time as Attorney General of the United States
remarked, "[t]o those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost
liberty, my message is this: Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our
national unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition to America's
enemies." 99 So, just think of today's per/version of patriotism as the political
counterpart to the current per/version of originalism as a form of respectable or
plausible jurisprudence. 1" Just another cheap "political practice."
Yet, in American constitutional and political history, the concept of patri-
otism aligns with the concept of revolution, of armed revolution, of organized
armed uprising. Remember? It was the "patriots" against the "loyalists," at
least originally. 1 ' The deviant episodes marked by the Federalist campaigns
of the 1790s, or the McCarthyism of the 1950s - both now still and firmly in
the national hall of really big shames - stand in stark contrast to these origins.
In the storyline of this country, the "original" revolutionaries were the "patri-
ots" precisely because they asked the impolite questions, made disturbing
noise, and stood up against governmental power - even if that government was
formally lawful under then-existing political structures or systems. Whether
one agrees with the Framers' decision to rebel, their personal and organized
actions in defiance of the lawful rulers of the world's then-only superpower
did, in fact, take a lot of sustained individual courage - the diametric opposite
of sycophantic obedience to formally lawful authorities. And so does patriot-
ism today.
For better or worse, the American notion of patriotism - not writ large in
some philosophical or abstracted way, but in the specific context of this Consti-
tution and of the legal and political history of the United States - thus stands
for the proposition that the people have a right to call upon the people to revolt
Indochina, Part I The (Troubled) Constitutionality of the War They Told Us About, 42
STAN. L. REV. 877 (1990); John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part II: The
Unconstitutionality of the War They Didn't Tell Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1093 (1990)
(recounting, and assessing the constitutionality of, the nation's last undeclared war).
98 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 85, at 960-78 (reviewing this feature of the current scheme).
" See, e.g., Ashcroft: Critics of New Terror Measures Undermine Effort, CNN.coM, Dec.
7, 2001, available at http://www.cnn.com/2001[US/12/O6/inv.ashcroft.hearing/.
100 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (on currently dominant versions of original-
ism). In particular, see Post & Siegel, supra note 12, at 545 (on originalism as a political as
well as legal phenomenon).
101 For a solid recounting, see BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERI-
CAN REVOLUTnON (enlarged ed. 1992). In particular, review the Framers' "logic of rebel-
lion." Id. at 94-160.
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against their oppressors, their rulers. Unless, perhaps, one's aim is to ignite a
new round of McCarthyism in this country, or a return of the rush to tyranny
witnessed by the founding generation under the wane of the Federalists and
their "laws" against immigrants and so-called sedition. If those are not your
ends, however, American-style patriotism is more about dissenting vocally and
physically from the "legal" subversion of national values by rulers, and less
about blind obedience to politicians who somehow have gotten their hands on
the people's government, not to mention our treasury. 102
This reminder of patriotism's meaning in the American political lexicon
should sound familiar - as should all of the facts that belie the preceding Big
Lies, which we have outlined so briefly here today. Indeed, it's all traditional
stuff; nothing critical or radical here - just a sprinkling of ironic (or princi-
pled?) originalism. And by the way, I've not tried in this Lecture to propose
that the Framers or revolutionaries were good guys, or bad guys, for that mat-
ter. Nor the Federalists or Anti-Federalists. Nor any other politician or faction
(except of course for the "evil-doers" behind the ongoing culture wars).' 0 3 In
this Lecture I have accepted as a given the Framers' original sketch of humans
and society. Without doubt, over history the various factions mentioned in this
Lecture have all acted like the petty schemers and piggish combinations of self
interest that the Framers' explicitly had in mind when they crafted the design
and contents of the document; they have endeavored to "vex and oppress" each
other, and the rest of us, out of greed, ambition, righteousness, arrogance, igno-
rance, and vanity."o
Thus, with this final Big Lie, I'm just trying to remind us all that it's
demonstrably false and simply stupid for ignorant or cunning fools to proclaim
now, after this long and known history, that patriotism somehow equals
unquestioning obedience to the latest dictates of a government official, or his or
102 For a contemporary essay sounding some of these general points, see Michael Kazin, A
Patriotic Left, DISSENT, Fall 2002, at 41.
103 This Lecture simply does not allow for an exhaustive teasing of the many angles that the
big-picture concepts discussed here might beckon. The limited purpose of this discussion
therefore has been to bring into sharp relief some of the many corrosive ideas, or Big Lies,
that help to enable and explain much of today's constitutional dangers. These Big Lies, as
we have seen, are cross-associated conceptually, politically, and ideologically. Today, they
are being hawked principally by politicians and political appointees with formal lawmaking
power, and by the networks that have installed them into power, to misuse that power in the
name of the Constitution and its Framers. In this way, they disclaim responsibility for the
horrors they perpetrate, shift attention to history and the Framers, and thereby attempt to
cloak their Big Lies in a sense of principle and legitimacy. In fact, however, as we have seen
their maneuvers depend greatly on mass ignorance, on the widespread suppression of docu-
mented facts and documentable knowledge. See supra note 31 and accompanying text (on
caveats).
14 Key Framers of the Constitution explained their work-product to their own generation by
presenting it as a system of checks and balances designed to ensure that no political, social,
or identity-based "faction" would ever be able to "vex and oppress" - in other words, to
subordinate - others in perpetuity; though the most salient social groups in the minds of the
Framers were religiously based, they expressed the concern in terms of social groups or
"factions" constructed by identity, geography, property, or industry. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 10, at 55 (James Madison) (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., Martino Publishing, 2001);




her minions - yes, even if it's the Parliament, or the King and his ministers. Or
the current occupants of the White House and their agents. In fact, as this
suppressed or conveniently ignored historical knowledge reminds us, "patriot-
ism" equals just about the exact opposite of blind personal obedience to for-
mally lawful governments. So please, next time someone uses "patriotism" to
bludgeon critical inquiry or silence civic dissent, try a bit of original patriotism:
remind that sorry soul of this powerful history, this liberating knowledge.
IV. RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW: TRUTH,
ACCOUNTABILITY, RECONCILIATION?
Is it just me, or is it just about now that Jerome's booming voice would be
asking us whether we had begun to think about what comes next and how we
might or should contribute to a better aftermath, a next reconstruction? Will
the next cycle of the political, legal, and constitutional history of this country
be like that of this country after the Civil War? Or do we look to the experi-
ence with tribunals after the Second World War? Or do we learn from Spain
after Franco, Argentina after the Junta, Chile after Pinochet, South Africa after
Apartheid, Indonesia after the Marcos? Do we seek lessons from Romania,
Hungary, the Czech Republic, or other former Soviet satellites after socializa-
tion? What do we do? Have you begun to think about that?
As this litany illustrates, the historical examples are many, and the models
they suggest are "different" but the query for us as critical legal scholars
remains constant: What does a society do when a period of official, "legal"
criminality ends, and the criminals live amongst us still? 0 5 To which historical
experience, including those of this nation, should we turn when we try to look
beyond the horrors of the moment and imagine setting the stage for a better
future - at least a functional restoration of formal democracy and due process
of law? What do we do, politically and constitutionally, with a legacy of such
massive illegality, like the one being accumulated each day of the past six years
through abuses of power, known and unknown - power certainly stolen in
2000, and (perhaps, probably?) re-stolen in 2004.1"6 Apart from minimal
levels of coerced obeisance, then, should we take seriously, as binding Law, the
extra-legal assertions of the corrupt politicians and "ruffians in robes"' 7 who,
105 [T]he question is not merely when will the stack of lies, of abuses become so high, so
unstable, so inexcusable that the entire nation finally takes notice and the whole house of
cards comes crashing to the ground in a big nasty soul-jarring spirit-cleansing patriotism-
redefining whoomp and smothers the whole lot of them, but rather, can it be soon enough?
Mark Morford, Downing Street is for Liars: Why Aren't the Media Screaming About
the Latest Proofs of Bush's War Scams? Don't You Know?, S.F. CHRON., June 22, 2005,
available at 2005 WLNR 10166573 (commenting on the release of memos between Bush
cronies and the British government indicating that the Iraq invasion was indeed an inten-
tional fraud on Congress and the people); see also infra note 118 and sources therein (on the
facts of this "conspiracy" and the attendant profiteering).
106 See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); see also ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, SUPREME INJUS-
TICE: HOW THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED ELECTION 2000 (2001); GREG PALAST, THE BEST
DEMOCRACY MONEY CAN BUY (2003).
107 I borrow the colorful phrase from none other than John Ashcroft, the notorious politician
whom Bush installed into office as Attorney General after his defeat for re-election to the
Senate from Missouri. See, e.g., Robyn E. Blumner, Ashcroft's Rule of Law Not Necessarily
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enabled in great part by Big Lies, have installed each other into public office
and currently occupy or control the executive (and judicial) branches of the
federal government? 10 8 Which model, or mix of models, can or should we help
to develop now, using our skills as critical scholars proactively, to ensure effec-
tive accountability after this official reign of terrifying impunity?
Originalist exultation over their reconquest of law and society can lead to
failure by overreach, as the current occupant of the Oval Office might demon-
strate in the form of his principal historical legacy.10 9 In the meantime, the
predatory machinations and pernicious sneakiness that cover for the erosion of
democracy, liberty, and the Rule of Law from coast to coast are taking their toll
- a toll that will last far beyond the next two years. The question thus left is:
what next? Have we begun to work through these weighty queries? Are we
preparing to do our part toward a restoration of formal democracy and the Rule
of Law in the United States? Are we helping to forge the legal frameworks for
truth and accountability?" o And if not us, then who? Who? Think about it,
literally: who, if not us?
These questions, my friends, are not outlandish, nor premature. On the
contrary, they are queuing up and demanding attention. As the historical exam-
ples to which I have only briefly alluded illustrate, other generations and socie-
ties have had to come to grips with their like, for better or worse. So will we,
for better or for worse.
V. MANTRAS FOR SURVIVAL AND CALLS TO ACTION: FROM THEORY
TO PRAXIS
I close this year's Lecture with the four mantras of critical survival and the
two calls for concrete collective action to which I referred at the outset. The
mantras are somewhat simple reminders, which I repeat to myself when I need
some re/grounding, and that I offer here to you as affirmations to recall in
moments of fatigue. The calls for action close these brief thoughts on a for-
ward-looking note. Both the mantras and the calls are designed to enable, sus-
tain, and focus a collective move, on our part, from theory to praxis regarding
specifically the constitution of terror within the United States, and the Big Lies
that on the surface serve to normalize this "legal" subversion of formal
democracy.
Constitutional, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Nov. 18, 2001, at 6D (quoting his remark, and
reviewing Ashcroft's record of legal subversion of democratic constitutionalism throughout
his entire career as a politician).
108 For a pointed elaboration of this point, see Bruce Ackerman, The Court Packs Itself,
AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 12, 2001, at 48 (noting that the decision in the Gore litigation was "not
the first time in history that the Supreme Court has made a decision that called its fundamen-
tal legitimacy into question," but that this time was unique because of the direct meddling in
electoral politics at the highest level).
109 Newly-elected Senator James Webb of Virginia, who previously served in the Reagan
Administration, was the first to note that Bush had become "a failed president" with "two
years to try to show some true leadership." See David Lerman, Webb Has Influential Roles
in First Week, DAILY PRESS, Jan. 14, 2007, at Al.
110 Fortunately, much important work along these lines already has been pioneered. See
infra note 118 and sources cited therein (on the thievery, deception, and thuggery of the
current occupants of the federal executive office).
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First, remember always that we are citizens of multiple communities, and
this multiplicity will make demands upon us that stretch (and sometimes out-
strip) our abilities. The legal academy, as much as our communities of origin
or residence, represents a community to which we must attend. The academy is
one of our communities - and is itself the site of multiple battlefronts in the
historical quest for social justice.'11 Therefore, we've got to do serious
antisubordination work, both here and there; the question is not "here or there"
but rather "here and there."
Second, never doubt that legal scholarship and teaching are always,
always political - always were, always are, always will be, at least legal schol-
arship."12 Ain't no way it can be otherwise, in a legalistic society that uses law
to help engineer and mask, if not outright valorize, social castes and ills. So
don't vex yourself imagining otherwise, much less trying to perform the impos-
sible. Protect yourself from those who are still in the Matrix' 13 - those who are
still blinded by "objectivity" or "neutral principles" and other entrenched legal
fictions. But don't vex yourself. Just continue, best you honestly can, with
your part in this ongoing, historical relay race toward postponed reckonings.
Third, be confident in your sense that this moment, this historical moment
in which we live right now, represents a truly extraordinary time. Cultural
warfare is not mom-and-pop democracy in action." 4 The sustained, orches-
trated, extreme efforts undertaken to control judges - from appointment 1 5 to
''' Harris et al, supra note 1 (discussing LatCrit efforts within legal academia).
112 Not coincidentally, this mantra is also one of the original LatCrit "guideposts." Id.
13 This film, for good reason, is seen as a metaphor for the situation at hand. See, e.g.,
STEPHEN FALLER, BEYOND THE MATRIX: REVOLUTIONS AND REVELATIONS (2004).
114 As previously described, this term refers to the rollback agenda of the "culture wars"
taking place during the past quarter century. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text
(on cultural warfare).
115 The success of this grand-scale "court packing" backlash scheme has long been noted,
and well documented. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Appointments at Mid-
Term: Shaping the Bench in His Own Image, 66 JUDICATURE 335 (1982-83); Sheldon
Goldman, Reagan's Judicial Legacy: Completing the Puzzle and Summing Up, 72 JUDICA-
TURE 318 (1989) (all on Reagan's judicial appointments and their ideological effects on the
federal judiciary). By the turn of the century, Reagan's escalated ideological scrutiny and
techniques to ensure ideological purity had produced a paralyzing polarization in the confir-
mation process, especially in election years: in 1988, when Ronald Reagan faced a Demo-
cratic Senate, the senators approved forty-two of his judicial nominees; in 1992, when
George Bush similarly faced a Democratic Senate, the senators approved sixty-six of his
judicial nominees; in 1996, when Bill Clinton faced a Republican Senate, the senators
approved a mere seventeen of his judicial nominees. Jon Gottschall, Reagan's Appoint-
ments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial Revolution, 70 JUDICA-
TURE 48 (1986). See Frank Davies, Senate Stalling New Judges: Republicans Block New
Judgeships, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 6, 2000, at 1A (reporting the increased blocking of federal
judicial appointments on ideological grounds).
The same rhetoric and campaign continues to this day, as the daily news reports demon-
strate. See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Vows to Seek Conservative Judges, N.Y. TIMES,
March 29, 2002, at A24; Robert A. Carp et al., The Decision-Making Behavior of George W.
Bush's Judicial Appointees: Far-Right, Conservative or Moderate?, 88 JUDICATURE 20
(2004) (reporting that overall voting patterns indicate that the most recent appointees "are
among the most conservative on record").
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intimidation 116 - are only some examples. Others include the unprecedented
spectacle of those same judges taking control of elections at the highest levels
of national life, and installing into public power by dictum their patrons and
allies." 7 And then combining to use their control of public office to undo
established laws and re-establish social inequality, to demonize political oppo-
nents and suppress dissenting expression, to pillage the public Treasury and
enrich their cronies, and to otherwise abuse the mechanisms of public authority,
subverting democratic norms and institutions in pursuit of perpetual power and
personal or familial profit." 8 This is not politics as usual; cultural warfare
For a broader historical account of how the federal judiciary became so politicized, see
RICHARD HODDER-WILLIAMS, THE POLITICS OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 33-45 (1980) (on
the politics of the Nixon nominations to the Supreme Court).
116 In addition to manipulation of the nominations and appointments processes, backlash
politicians also have tried to intimidate sitting judges into complying with their ideological
preferences. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, In America: A Plan to Intimidate Judges, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 4, 2000, at A29 (documenting the coordinated effort to force judicial compliance with
backlash imperatives); Edward Walsh & Dan Eggen, Ashcroft Orders Tally of Lighter
Sentences: Critics Say He Wants 'Blacklist' of Judges, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2003, at A I
(reporting a Justice Department directive ordering U.S. attorneys across the country to be
"more aggressive" in reporting judicial deviations from the federal sentencing guidelines,
which had been promulgated in large part to discipline "liberal" judges painted as "soft" on
criminals and too sympathetic to the constitutional rights of the accused). Ironically, the
Supreme Court later held those guidelines unconstitutional. See United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220 (2005).
The obvious aim of these law-politics dynamic is to cow independent judges, and to
coerce as may be necessary their conformance with the politics of backlash - so much so
that even William Rehnquist, the backlash-identified Chief Justice, was prompted prior to his
death to complain of this concerted effort at congressional intimidation of federal judges.
See Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Attacks a Law as Infringing on Judges, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 1, 2004, at A14 (reporting Rehnquist's "unusually pointed" criticism to enactment of a
federal statute similar to the Ashcroft directive, which "places federal judges under special
scrutiny for sentences that fall short of those called for the federal sentencing guidelines.").
A year later, Rehnquist sounded the same skeptical note in his annual report on the state
of the federal judiciary: "There have been suggestions to impeach federal judges who issue
decisions regarded by some as out of the mainstream. And there were several bills intro-
duced in the last Congress that would limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts to decide
constitutional challenges to certain kinds of government action." These actions include
efforts "to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to the phrase 'under God'
in the Pledge of Allegiance, to the display of the Ten Commandments on government prop-
erty and to the Defense of Marriage Act, a federal law that permits states to withhold recog-
nition of same-sex marriages performed in other states" despite constitutional commitments
and norms of mutual recognition. Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Resumes His Call for Judi-
cial Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2005, at A10. These and similar political efforts
targeting judicial independence, Rehnquist concluded, "could appear to be an unwarranted
and ill-considered effort to intimidate individual judges." Id.
117 See generally supra notes 106-08 and sources cited therein (on the 2000 election and
related issues).
1 s As we all know all too well, news reports have been brimming with incredible facts for
years, which can serve as leads to formal investigations, but the most telling development is
the stunning expos6 and repudiation issued recently in book form by one of the earliest
designers of backlash politics. See KEVIN PHILLIPS, AMERICAN DYNASTY: ARISTOCRACY,
FORTUNE AND THE POLITICS OF DECEIT IN THE HOUSE OF BUSH (2004). In like vein, during
the past year a series of books have been published that jointly establish a solid point of
departure for prosecution, impeachment, and the like. See, e.g., ELIZABETH DE LA VEGA,
United States v. Bush (2006) (laying out the basics for a classic legal case based on conspir-
Summer 2007] 1005
1006 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 7:973
amounts to a commandeering of formal democracy to conduct a neocolonial
resurrection, a sociopolitical "cleansing" of North American society, a roll-
back of civil rights and liberties that no truly free, just, and open society can
long endure.11 9 These times are indeed extraordinary; they aren't entirely
unprecedented, but they are undoubtedly extraordinary. And these extraordi-
nary times thus call on us to imagine, create, and undertake extraordinary
corrections.
The fourth, and last, mantra of survival is crucial: appreciate your own
finitude. Our interventions and corrections, both individual and collective, will
always be limited, imperfect, and fragile.' 2 ° In a world of enormous derange-
ment, our critical exertions never have been, and never can be, good enough to
match the scale of evil and exploitation confronting us. And that's okay, too. I
wish it were different, but it's not. So we - you - do what we/you can, the best
we/you can. This last mantra is not a rationalization to enable excuses or com-
placency; it's just a reminder that, at the end of the day, we are finite, and
acy to defraud the United States through trickery); MICHAEL ISIKOFF & DAVID CORN,
HUBRIS: THE INSIDE STORY OF SPIN, SCANDAL AND THE SELLING OF THE IRAQ WAR (2006)
(detailing key facts of the conspiracy as it regards the invasion of Iraq); T. CHRISTIAN
MILLER, BLOOD MONEY: WASTED BILLIONS, LOST LIVES AND CORPORATE GREED IN IRAQ
(2006) (exposing the pattern of corruption and profiteering among the conspirers and their
clique); FRANK RICH, THE GREATEST STORY EVER SOLD: THE DECLINE AND FALL OF TRUTH
FROM 9/11 TO KATRINA (2006) (similarly detailing the pattern of lies, deceptions and other
crimes and misdemeanors involved the conspiracy); THOMAS E. RICKS, FIASCO: THE AMERI-
CAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAQ (2006) (focusing on the public relations machinery cre-
ated to conduct the conspiracy); RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE (2006)
(documenting the intentional manipulation of intelligence under the direct orders of Dick
Cheney, current occupant of the Vice Presidency, to "sell" the conspiracy to Congress and
the American people); BOB WOODWARD, STATE OF DENIAL: BUSH AT WAR, PART III (2006)
(providing insider accounts of the facts related to the conspiring).
119 For example, in defending the 2000 nomination of John Ashcroft - a prominent but
recently defeated backlash politician from Missouri - to take over the federal Justice Depart-
ment and become the nation's chief federal law enforcement officer, a backlash-identified
talk show host based in the nation's capital declared, "[t]his is culture war - two mutually
exclusive world views continue to fight for preeminence in our culture." James Kuhnhenn &
Ron Hutcheson, Ashcroft is Next Political Flash Point; Partisan Lines are Clearly Drawn,
MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 11, 2001, at IA. For other examples of today's cultural warfare in
action, see Comment, Critical Race Theory and Proposition 187: The Racial Politics of
Immigration Law, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 118 (1995) (deconstruction the racialized
political dynamics of that early Proposition); Nicolas Espiritu, (E)Racing Youth: The
Racialized Construction of California's Proposition 21 and the Development of Alternate
Contestations, 52 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 189 (2005) (focusing on cultural warfare against youth
of color in California through the use of the proposition system in that state); Kevin R.
Johnson, An Essay on Immigration Politics, Popular Democracy, and California's Proposi-
tion 187: The Political Relevance and Legal Irrelevance of Race, 70 WASH. L. REv. 629,
650-58 (1995) (analyzing the racial rhetoric and politics of Proposition 187); see also Kevin
R. Johnson, Public Benefits and Immigration: The Intersection of Immigration Status,
Ethnicity, Gender and Class, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1509 (1995) (analyzing the identity politics
and social consequences of recent legal "reforms"); see generally supra notes 70-93 and
sources cited therein (on the politics of cultural warfare).
120 This mantra reflects a familiar LatCritical refrain. See, e.g., Francisco Valdes, Fore-
word: Under Construction-LatCrit Consciousness, Community and Theory, 85 CAL. L.
REV. 1087, 1093-94 (1997), 10 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1998).
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everything we attempt is flawed, but none of us can afford to let these facts
drive us crazy, into paralysis.
Hoping that these mantras will help ensure our survival, if not our success,
I close with two calls for collective action, which I hope will channel our col-
lective creativity and energy toward a move from theory to praxis on the chal-
lenges mounting before us. Both calls are to individual initiative - collective
action being, after all, the coordination of individual wills and acts. But plainly
both also require coordination and collaboration; both entail steps or processes
that span multiple skills and areas of knowledge - from legal research and
critical analysis to document-creation and coalition-building. Both, in short,
focus squarely on the kinds of skills that we can bring to bear on the situation at
hand as formally trained legal scholars. To do the work sketched below
requires us to engage the constitution of terror in this country as a community
of activist and critical legal scholars.
First, we need to get on the ball, to help with a plan for the restoration of
the Rule of Law in the United States. We must use our scholarly skills and
positions to contribute to the elaboration, in real time, of conceptual, doctrinal,
and constitutional frameworks for accountability, so that the nation has sub-
stantive options when these criminals are out of power, when questions of
power abuses can be seriously visited. And we need to ensure these options
include consideration of international recourse, as well as domestic legal
regimes. "' Suspected criminals like Kissinger ought to be afraid to travel, just
like Pinochet - a Kissinger monstrosity - finally came to feel afraid. 2 2 Bush
too, and Cheney and Rumsfeld. We must help to ensure accountability from
the principals and profiteers, not only from the low-level scapegoats thrown to
the namby-pamby so-called "liberal" press as scandal fodder, as we witnessed
recently after the expos6 of military-sponsored torture in the Abu Ghraib
prison."' Those who have orchestrated today's abuses of power and purse are
the ones who need to be dogged by the intellectual and legal framework that we
are uniquely positioned to help develop. Will we do so? Or will they all really
just walk?
121 See generally Berta Esperanza Hernindez-Truyol, Building Bridges: Bringing Interna-
tional Human Rights Home, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 69 (1996) (urging LatCrit and other OutCrit
scholars to link analyses of "domestic" legal issues to frameworks offered by international
law sources).
122 Recently declassified documents corroborate long-held suspicions that Kissinger tacitly
authorized the Pinochet coup against his country's democratically elected President Allende,
and by extension the bloodthirsty political cleansing that took place immediately afterward.
See Dep't of State, Memorandum of Conversation (June 8, 1976) (transcribing conversation
between Pinochet and Kissinger). The prosecution of Pinochet, and the revelation of U.S.
complicity in his and similar crimes, have created a new level of concern among human
rights violators used to operating with impunity. See, e.g., Laurie Goering, Wariness of
Arrest Abroad Keeps Many in S. America, CHI. TRIBUNE, Dec. 15, 1998, at 6; Rupert
Cornwell, The Trials of Kissinger, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 23, 2002, at 4. Though Ameri-
can military and political might protects suspected criminals from effective investigation and
prosecution, in time these recent developments might lead to a different international envi-
ronment that ensures accountability even among the most powerful politicians.
1213 See, e.g., Bob Herbert, On Abu Ghraib, the Big Shots Walk, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2005,




Second, we need to start enlisting the international community in the res-
toration of electoral integrity and formal democracy within the United States.
We can begin by contacting other organized groups, other NGOs,12 4 both
within and beyond the country, to help build the political and intellectual
framework for international monitoring of state and federal elections through-
out this country; as people, as citizens and residents of this country, as victims
of this tyranny, we need to call for international observers to do what this coun-
try is accustomed to doing for everybody else around the world. As legal
scholars, working together with other concerned groups, we can help to formu-
late and issue a broad-based call for international safeguarding of the electoral
process in the United States, demanding that established international standards
for ascertaining electoral integrity be independently enforced here, and until
such time as local and national elections can be certified as free and fair. Until
we know that politics matter and voting counts; in other words, at least until the
mad rush toward paperless voting is tempered by a national requirement of a
foolproof paper trail."15
To begin the move toward praxis on the issues of democracy, accountabil-
ity, and the Rule of Law outlined above, we can build on the existing structure
of collective projects that we have established and nurtured during the past
decade. Our academic events, like this annual LatCrit Conference, provide
ready venues for the exploration and development of a plan of action through
presentations, workshops, panels, and the like. Other regular academic events
that we conduct, such as the South-North Exchange on Theory, Culture and
Law ("SNX"), 126 and the International and Comparative Law Colloquium
124 In 2006 LatCrit, Inc. secured formal accreditation to operate as an NGO (non-govern-
mental organization) before the United Nations. For more information on the LatCrit NGO
project, please visit the LatCrit website at http://www.latcrit.org.
125 This requirement seems to be the only readily available minimal step toward checking
the seemingly heightened tendency to steal elections. The national experience with the 2000
presidential election is of course the primary exemplar of this problem, and of the crisis of
confidence in law and democracy that it produces. This self-inflicted damage is exemplified
by the public acknowledgement of the current Court's most senior Republican appointee,
John Paul Stevens, who frankly conceded in the aftermath of the 5-4 halt to vote-counting in
2000 that those five Justices' action in Bush v. Gore had seriously shaken "the Nation's
confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law." 531 U.S. 98, 129 (2000)
(Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 106-08 and sources cited therein (on the 2000
controversies and their consequences).
126 The South-North Exchange on Theory, Culture and Law ("SNX") is a newer project
designed to bring together critical theorists from various disciplines and regions of the hemi-
sphere (and beyond) to discuss problems in the application of theory to current social
problems and policy issues. The basic concept is to create a venue focused on south-north
relations, and on issues that affect or constitute south-north polarities, to strengthen LatCrit
theory and praxis in hemispheric terms. This annual encounter convened for the first time in
mid-December 2003, and has met annually since then at the campus of the InterAmerican
University of Puerto Rico School of Law in San Juan, Puerto Rico, to focus critical attention
on various substantive themes ranging from constitutional reform to the rights of indigenous
people. The next SNX was scheduled for May 10-12, 2007 in Rio de Janeiro, Brasil, under
the theme of "Race & Color Across the Americas: Comparative Constructions of Racial and
Ethnic Subjugation." For more information on the 2007 SNX please contact this year's
SNX Program Coordinators, Professors Jo.o Feres Jtinior at jferes@iuperj.com.br and




("ICC"),' 27 provide established venues that already enable discussion and
action with scholars, activists, and NGOs across the hemisphere and world.
Our academic journal, CLAVE,' 2 8 can help us publish and disseminate texts,
and more geneially to raise awareness of suppressed yet liberating knowledge.
In short, our individual initiatives and community efforts during the past dec-
ade, now in the form of the LatCrit Portfolio of Projects, provide a flexible
platform from which we can devise the best means of antisubordination praxis
for this particular occasion.
129
Fortunately, the individual and collective labors of our first decade now
offer us a functioning infrastructure for personal and collective initiative. But
as individuals situated in varied and far-flung institutional settings we addition-
ally can offer courses and seminars; organize conferences and clinics; publish
essays, columns, articles, and books; deliver talks in diverse venues; and gener-
ally undertake a host of other possible consciousness-raising, action-inducing
activities that tap our skills and leverage our institutional positions or resources.
Clearly, then, we are trained and positioned to act, both as individuals and a
community.
And, as citizens of multiple communities we also can and should call upon
our Senators and Representatives in Congress - at least those we think might
care about separation of powers, deliberative democracy, and due process of
law. Advise them of our plans, our project. Explain who we are, and the
resources we can bring to the table. Invite them to join us in these efforts, to
support our determination that government be made once again to bow, or at
least nod seriously, to Law. Offer to share informal, periodic updates on our
127 The LatCrit Colloquium on International and Comparative Law ("ICC") has met seven
times since 1995 in locations ranging from Miami to Mdlaga to Santiago de Chile to Buenos
Aires and Cape Town. This rotating Colloquium aims to foster transnational and interdisci-
plinary interaction among LatCrit theorists in the United States and elsewhere with scholars,
activists, and policymakers at the sites where the Colloquium meets. As with the Annual
Conferences, the Annual Call for Papers, Panels and Participation is posted on the LatCrit
website, and the program proceedings subsequently are published in the form of law review
symposia. For more information, please contact the LatCrit ICC/CGC Project Team coordi-
nator, Professor Robert Westley at rwestley@law.tulane.edu, or Professor Yanira Reyes at
reyesyanira@ hotmail.com.
128 CLAVE (kli-ve) is the LatCrit academic journal published in hard copy as well as
online. The hard copy issue is published by the Inter-American University of Puerto Rico
("IAUPR") School of Law and is a peer-reviewed periodical with two issues per year edited
by a LatCrit Board of Editors and Contributing Editors in conjunction with a Student Edito-
rial Board. The online version is managed by the same editorial board with teams that work
on English, Spanish, and Portuguese submissions. The hard copy Journal is administered
through the IAUPR School of Law. The hard copy version features articles and notes
focused on antisubordination theory. The online issue is managed through the University of
California-Berkeley School of Law. The online version of CLAVE features a diverse variety
of both collective works, such as symposia based on various LatCrit programs or events, as
well as individual articles or montages submitted for publication year-round. For more
information please visit the CLAVE website at http://clave.org.
129 The LatCrit Portfolio of Projects consists of all initiatives or events undertaken collec-
tively by the LatCrit community, and thus is a constantly evolving collection of efforts.
Projects range from academic events and publications, to student-oriented programs and
scholarships, to NGO-related activities that aim to influence policy-making internationally.




progress, and to coordinate plans and actions. Suggest they call upon us in
turn, should enough in the Congress develop the spine and will to consider
substantively investigating and analyzing the high crimes and misdemeanors of
the past six years. We are all able to do all this. Are we willing? Are we
ready?
Our scholarly skills, our critical passions, and our antisubordination com-
mitments constitute a unique and key combination of human resources to help
catalyze and sustain the momentous undertakings necessary to press for
accountability and restoration of democracy and law in the wake of this long
inter-national nightmare. If Jerome were with us today, more than only in
spirit, I think this much is the least he would expect, if not demand, both of
himself and of us. For posterity's sake, I hope we will timely rise to the occa-
sion. And on that hope, I turn to conclude these thoughts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Perhaps at times during this Lecture you thought you felt moments of
bombast and hyperbole. If so, I hope they reminded you of Jerome at his best -
his booming voice, his thumping fist, his plain talk. I certainly tried to conjure
him here for us - "intended" it to be so. Because, you see, I think that if you
linger and reflect on those moments, you might conclude that every word of
this Lecture, like Jerome's own body of work, utters a documented or docu-
mentable fact and speaks to a truth you know.
Perhaps more importantly, I was emboldened by a little yet electrifying
encounter on my way here, for this very Lecture, to follow, as much as I could,
in Jerome's footsteps today - to speak plainly, without the qualifications and
equivocations that, in the name of nuance and grace, can suck the life out of
most legal discourse. This little incident made me think, for the first time in
quite a while, that our comeback will, indeed, come. Plus, Jerome always knew
how to work a good parable into his thinking to drive home the human and
intellectual point of his message.
During the past couple of days that we have been here, I have discussed
briefly with some of you, and debated interminably with myself, whether I
should dare to wear this special T-shirt here today, for this Lecture. Reflecting,
I think, the sense of orchestrated intimidation and self-censorship I previously
described as a mark of these troubled times, most of you (of those to whom I
spoke) confirmed my own inclinations, and fears, by cautioning against it. And
though that, too, was my tendency, I finally could not do it; at the last minute, I
put the thing on and came over here.
As I walked up the big lawn out front, and toward this hall, a patrol car
with spinning red-and-blue lights seemed headed our way. Slowly it
approached, and the more it neared the more it seemed to be deliberately com-
ing toward us. My thoughts raced to your precautions and my own trepidation.
I was incredulous, questioning what my eyes were telling me. For a flash, I
thought: "Could I, too, really be disappeared?" "No, it's impossible," I told
myself. Or is it? Given the message of the Lecture I was prepared to deliver,
my mind wondered as seconds ticked.
1010 [Vol. 7:973
Summer 2007] CONSTITUTION OF TERROR 1011
Pulling up alongside us, with tinted power window rolling down, a hand-
some officer of the law leaned over and said, "Great T-shirt." Dizzied, I said,
"Excuse me?" He repeated, "Great T-shirt," this time with a thumbs-up as the
window went up and the car drove away.
I stood there in disbelief, and slowly joy swelled. As I took in this huge
little incident, I decided: if that young lad in law enforcement can understand
this historical moment and the stakes in play, and stop to applaud a long-haired
stranger sporting a T-shirt with the visage of the guy in the White House,
accompanied by the words "international terrorist" in bold letters, then the act
of speaking these truths to you, in plain talk, seems less an expression of civic
courage than an acceptance of a minimal obligation to truth and Justice. And
that's what I hope we always do.
Given this urgent obligation, and our core convictions, perhaps, the Fram-
ers' "original" example is where the journey before us might, or should, ulti-
mately lead. And, as was the case back then, this possibility, dear friends, is no
hyperbole. Think on it. And thank you for this honor.
